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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States of America, broadcast television substantially shapes
society, society's perception of itself, and society's definitions of culture.'
Television is so much a part of life in this country that, like breathing, its
impact is rarely recognized. Television is society at its least critical:
[T]elevision has achieved the status of "myth[;]" . . . [it is] a way
of understanding the world that is not problematic, that we are not
fully conscious of, that seems, in a word, natural. A myth is a way
of thinking so deeply embedded in our consciousness that it is in-
visible. This is now the way of television.... We do not doubt the
reality of what we see on television, are largely unaware of the spe-
cial angle of vision it affords .... [T]elevision has gradually be-
come our culture. This means, among other things, that we rarely
talk about television, only about what is on television-that is,
about its content.2
We have ceased to question the role of television in shaping our society,
and have come to accept as true, the view of the world given us on televi-
sion.3 This vision, though, is a heavily-skewed one. It is the product of, and
reflects the values and views of, the dominant culture in this country.4
The technology of broadcast television allows only an extremely limited
number of stations to use the airwaves in a given geographical region, so
access to the airwaves is regulated.5 And because of the extent of television's
1. See generally ERWIN G. KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULA-
TION (3d ed. 1982).
2. NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE
OF SHOW BUSINESS 79 (1988).
3. "[T]he world as given to us through television seems natural, not bizarre." POSTMAN,
supra note 2, at 79.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 13-28.
5. A basic premise of this Article is that the scarcity of available frequencies for commer-
cial broadcasting, combined with the vital role of broadcasting in American society, require
government regulation. A small, but significant group of scholars believe that government
regulation of the airwaves is unnecessary, and that a free-market regulation of broadcasting is
a superior solution. New technologies may, one day, eradicate the scarcity problem that
plagues the airwaves; however, I disagree with those who maintain that at present, scarcity is
not an issue. A number of scholars have advanced such a position, including Ronald Coase.
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effect on the composition of our culture, its regulation raises special
concerns.
Television regulation has failed to serve all segments of U.S. society. Mi-
nority voices need to be heard and allowed to influence the majority culture.6
The public interest' requires this.
Despite a congressional directive to license stations in the "public inter-
est,"' neither the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Com-
mission"), which presents policies implementing that directive, nor the
judicial opinions scrutinizing those policies, reflects an understanding of the
importance to the majority of this country of hearing minority voices. The
meaning of public interest is not static; it reflects progressive social changes
and needs. The FCC and courts must recognize this as well.
This Article discusses the need for minority voices to be heard by those
who comprise the majority culture, and advocates increased minority access
to broadcast-television station ownership. Part II of this Article explores the
meaning of "public interest" today. First, it examines how majority-con-
trolled television programming has neglected to meaningfully include minor-
ity culture. This part next argues that minority views and ideas, in order to
be understood, must first be considered and included in the aggregate by the
majority culture. Part II also discusses the processes by which minority
voices may gradually gain recognition in the majority community. Finally,
See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1
(1959) (stating that broadcasting resources are neither scarce nor limited). For the perspective
of Mark Fowler, former Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), see
Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60
TEX. L. REV. 207, 221 (1982) (arguing that using spectrum scarcity to justify public-interest
license awards has "serious logical and empirical infirmities"). While on the bench, Judge
Robert Bork also stated that spectrum scarcity did not justify regulation of broadcast and not
print, Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508-09 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987). Professor Matthew Spitzer has maintained such a
position based on economic analysis. See Matthew L. Spitzer, Controlling the Content of Print
and Broadcast, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1349, 1358-64 (1985). Spitzer argues that scarcity fails as a
rationale for the regulation of broadcasting and not print, and therefore argues for a free mar-
ket for broadcasting. Each of the arguments in favor of a free market assumes technological
advances we have not yet made. In reality, broadcast-television spectrum scarcity presently
exists.
Although radio and cable television also must be regulated due to scarcity concerns, the
technical state of those media permit a greater number of stations to cover given geographical
regions. Thus, they present a less acute scarcity problem than does broadcast television.
6. By "majority culture," I mean the dominant culture in the United States, not world-
wide. The terms "majority" and "minority" refer not only to numbers but also to the relative
status of members of these groups in the United States.
7. For a definition of what I consider to serve the public interest, see infra part II.
8. Congress gave the FCC the exclusive power to award television-station licenses based
on "public convenience, interest, or necessity." See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151, 301, 303, 307, 309 (1982).
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it examines the barriers to creating majority acceptance of minority voices,
and suggests methods through which the barriers may be eroded.
Part III of this Article considers the sources of the FCC's authority to
regulate in the "public interest." This part discusses various regulations
promulgated by the FCC and analyzes the Commission's criteria for evaluat-
ing whether the "public interest" standard has been met.
Part IV of this Article considers the roles of the courts and Congress in
defining the "public interest." It examines the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,9 and the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's subsequent holding
in Lamprecht v. FCC."0 This part contends that these two cases have estab-
lished an inappropriate standard against which FCC preferences for minori-
ties and women in the ownership and licensing of broadcast stations must be
measured. This part also questions the judicial establishment of a require-
ment that the nexus between a problem identifed by Congress, and its resolu-
tion, be empirically demonstrable.
Finally, this Article concludes that the Metro Broadcasting and Lam-
precht decisions, taken together, have placed the determination of the FCC's
"public interest" standard in the hands of the courts. The power to deter-
mine the public good should be returned to Congress-an open, representa-
tive, and elected body.
II. PUBLIC INTEREST
As an immigrant nation, the United States is frequently referred to as a
"melting pot" society into which each arriving immigrant is absorbed." But
this term carries an often unarticulated subtext: the essential nature of what
is in the "pot" will not change as a result of any addition because arriving
immigrants must assimilate before being absorbed into the American cul-
ture. 12 It is a premise of this Article that the public interest is only served
9. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
10. 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
11. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 30-37 (1992).
12. The commonly misunderstood meaning of the term "melting pot" deviates from its
plain meaning and from its original usage. This deviation is a crystallization of the problem
posed by this Article. Webster's defines "melting pot" as: "2. a country, place, or area in
which immigrants of various nationalities and races are assimilated." WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY 845 (3d College ed. 1988). The common misunderstanding of the term
"melting pot" may well derive from the unarticulated subtext: you may enter our society and
become one of us, but first you must become one of us. It is misleading to label our country a
"melting pot" if, in fact, each immigrant must first alter his essential nature before being al-
lowed to integrate into society. A further unspoken message may be that we do not allow
certain groups to ever enter the pot. No amount of effort to assimilate will ever be enough for
those groups. See, e.g., ISRAEL ZANGWILL, THE MELTING POT 33 (Arno Press Inc. reprint
1975) (1909). It is no accident that Zangwill referred to "all the races of Europe ... melting
[Vol. 42:51
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when the opinions of all of the public are solicited. For this country to be a
melting pot, for the majority culture to benefit, for the minority cultures to
have a voice in our society, each culture or idea that is added to the pot must
be able to transform that which it joins in the pot.
A. Television: The Blue Light Through Which We See the World
Television is so much a part of our lives that we do not even see, let alone
question, the extent of its domination of our society. This section examines
the impact of television on our society. It also discusses the effect that the
depiction of minorities on television has on the majority culture. Finally,
other areas in which the majority culture has been affected by minority
voices are examined.
1. TV- Screening U.S. From Reality
The majority culture permeates television to the near exclusion of
minority voices.13 Of the very limited prime-time television fare featuring
and re-forming," id., rather than, for example, "all the races of the world." Zangwill's line is
not entirely explained by the prevailing attitude at the time he wrote. In 1908, the population
of the United States was made up of 78,658,000 whites, and 10,052,000 people (or 11.33% of
the population) classified as "Negro and other." See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF
CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, Series
A91-104, A 119-134 (1989). At the time Zangwill wrote, and for some time thereafter, it was
inconceivable to many in this country that African Americans or Asians would join in the
melting pot. It was not until 1959 that the Census Bureau even broke down the "Negro and
Other" category to "Negro" and "Other." Id. at A91-104.
13. One explanation for this lies in the small number of minority-owned broadcast-televi-
sion stations. See HERBERT J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S NEWS (1978). Justice Brennan
noted in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990):
[A]lthough for the past two decades minorities have constituted at least one-fifth of
the United States population, during this time relatively few members of minority
groups have held broadcast licenses .... [I]n 1978, minorities owned less than 1
percent of the Nation's radio and television stations .... [I]n 1986, they owned just
2.1 percent of the more than 11,000 radio and television stations in the United States.
Moreover, these statistics fail to reflect the fact that, as late entrants who often have
been able to obtain only the less valuable stations, many minority broadcasters serve
geographically limited markets with relatively small audiences.
Id. at 553-54 (citations omitted).
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blacks,14 (and there is little at present featuring other minorities)' 5 most of it
is extremely homogenized entertainment. One television critic, John
O'Connor, has noted that blacks are depicted on television as "the people
who get busted the most on all those police 'reality' shows. The diversity of
the black community, the social and political ferment within that commu-
nity, is reflected only occasionally. Both white and black viewers end up
shortchanged."1 6 The exceptions to this rule revolve around shows set safely
in the past, 7 where the creators of the show not only have the temporal
distance to absolve themselves, and the audience, of responsibility for the
discrimination, but the added reassurance that things are much better today.
14. Over the past 12 years, the three major television networks, ABC, CBS and NBC,
have offered no more than four hours each week of prime-time series with either predomi-
nantly-black casts or blacks as leading characters. That comes out to six percent of the 66
hours designated as prime time on the three networks, despite the fact that black viewers
account for 12 percent of the population and 13 percent of prime-time viewership. Kathryn
Harris, Money Talks, FORBES, May 28, 1990, at 40. Although much has been made of the Fox
Network's directing attention in programming towards black audiences, see, e.g., All Things
Considered: Blacks Strongly Identify with Black TV Programs (National Public Radio, Apr.
26, 1992), a recent analysis of TV Guide reveals only one and one-half hours of prime-time
programming on Fox that features black people. (Martin, Roc and In Living Color.)
15. Although at least two of the featured ensemble of characters in Northern Exposure are
eskimos, the star of the show is a young, white, male Jewish doctor from New York.
Hispanics fare even worse than blacks in terms of representation on television. A 1980
study revealed that only 53 of 3,549 characters studied were of Spanish origin. BRADLEY S.
GREENBERG, LIFE ON TELEVISION: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF U.S. TV DRAMA 6 (1980).
Other minorities fare poorly as well. See Kurt A. Wimmer, Deregulation and the Market
Failure in Minority Programming: The Socioeconomic Dimensions of Broadcast Reform, 8
COMM. ENT. 329, 340 (1985). A more recent analysis of TV Guide revealed only one show
featuring an hispanic on the six VHF channels in New York.
16. See John J. O'Connor, Blacks on TV: Scrambled Signals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991,
at HI, H36. In his article, O'Connor reviews the depictions of black life in the 1991 television
season's prime-time schedule. He points out that although the networks pay attention to rele-
vant social issues, it turns out that the broadcast-television industry's definition of "relevant
social issues" is defined, almost exclusively, as a discussion of Malcolm X. See id. at H36.
O'Connor points out that on two episodes of situation comedies featuring black families, True
Colors and The Royal Family, young men espousing Malcolm X's principles were introduced.
Id. In The Royal Family, the young man has not reappeared since and was dismissed in that
episode "for his apparently silly unwillingness to appreciate good old down-home pork chops."
Id. In True Colors, one of the black sons in the racially-mixed family around which the show
revolves, withdrew from the family after reading The Autobiography of Malcolm X. After
denouncing his family and creating "Little Africa" in the attic of their upper-middle class
home, he soon saw the error of his ways when he missed his own birthday party. "Cake and
ice cream, evidently, beat Malcolm X any day--on a television sitcom." Id.
17. O'Connor points out that there is one exception to the criticism he otherwise levels at
the networks' prime-time schedule: I'll Fly Away, a show set in the late 1950s. He notes that
"[tielevision is nearly always uncomfortable with harsh realities unless they are snuggled un-
threateningly in the past." Id.
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The unspoken and self-congratulatory message is that the members of to-
day's audience are responsible for the improvement."8
Almost without exception, minorities depicted on prime-time commercial
television are the majority's impression of what a minority either is or ought
to be like.' 9 That this characterization exists is no great surprise. The televi-
sion-station owners and executives, who are in charge of producing, buying
and distributing programming, are overwhelmingly members of the major-
ity. 20 That the television industry is a closed circle is apparent. Television
shapes the majority culture's views of minorities and the majority's view of
minorities predominates on television. The only way to break out of this
circle is by minority entry into broadcasting.
The minorities depicted on prime-time shows are not realistic. This criti-
cism is as easily leveled against the majority characters on television. Be-
cause it is entertainment, prime-time television is unreal. Everyone is
beautiful and most shows have happy endings. While screens full of beauti-
ful, rich people cause genuine self-image problems, 2' the imposition of a
18. For example, Separate But Equal gives the distinct impression that things are much
better now. An example drawn from the day-time schedule is the Donahue Martin Luther
King, Jr. birthday show where toothless Ku Klux Klan members crudely voiced their opinions
only to be rebutted by a respectable, mostly-white studio audience's platitudes about loving
one's neighbor. Donahue: Martin Luther King, Jr.: 25 Years Later (NBC television broadcast,
Apr. 4, 1988).
19. The implications of this have been examined thoroughly elsewhere. Attributions of
motive vary. Some critics believe the paucity of minorities in meaningful roles on television is
an instrument of social control to support the existing social order. See, e.g., Cedric C. Clark,
Television and Social Controls: Some Observations on the Portrayal of Ethnic Minorities, 8 TEL-
EVISION Q. 18 (1969); Henry Taylor & Carol Dozier, Television Violence, African-Americans
and Social Control 1950-1976, 14 J. BLACK STUD. 107 (1983). Others suggest this is simply a
function of the fact that programmers are, by and large, members of the majority community
whose audience image is a subconscious projection of their own middle- and upper-class status.
GANS, supra note 13.
One particularly egregious example of such shows was the short-lived Tequila and Bonnetti,
a CBS prime-time detective series. The lead of the show, Bonnetti, is a tough New York cop
whose black partner was gunned down in Brooklyn. Distraught, he relocated to Southern
California, where he was assigned a canine partner, who was his former partner, who has been
reincarnated as a French mastiff. The dog is preoccupied with sex, talks jive and calls his
partner "homeboy."
20. Wimmer, supra note 15, at 340 n.52. As N. Y Times television critic, John J.
O'Connor wrote about the fairy-tale depiction of race relations put forth by David Jacobs, the
white creator of Homefront, an ABC drama which features a black family: "Race relations
seem to unfold in a never-never land in which the local factory boss, a bigot and union-basher,
plots privately with his black chauffeur as to how to best handle their touchy wives. Yeah,
sure, Mr. Jacobs." O'Connor, supra note 16, at H36.
21. See, e.g., Lena Williams, Woman's Image in a Mirror: Who Defines What She Sees?,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1992, at Al (tracing women's lack of self-esteem to the unrealistic por-
trayal of women in the media and the failure of "real" women to measure up to that image);
NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH (1991) (positing that society's unrealistic portrayal of
women, as perpetrated by the media, is a political weapon to keep women down); GLORIA
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majoritarian view of beauty on minorities, for whom it is impossible to reach
that standard, poses a different problem with far-reaching consequences.
For minorities, the difference is not one of degree, but of kind.2 2
Because the majority culture does not know much about the minority cul-
ture, and is influenced by a distorted vision presented by television, that dis-
torted vision of the minority culture is the one that prevails among society's
majority.23 In some ways the most distorted vision we get of minorities on
television is neither from the super-successful characters, such as the Huxt-
ables on The Cosby Show, 24 nor from the scrappy, living day-to-day-in-the-
projects programming like that in Good Times. Rather, the more disturbing
distortions come from those shows where "the black" on the show lives
among whites without any recognition of his or her racial difference.25
STEINEM, REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN 227 (1992). Steinem contrasts her own public image
as "a thin, pretty, blondish woman" with the image she had of herself as a "plump brunette
from Toledo" and the difficulty reconciling the two. Steinem's case is particularly interesting
as her feelings of low self-esteem were generated not just from society's portrayal of women in
general, but of her specifically. STEINEM, supra, at 227.
22. Toni Morrison's novel, The Bluest Eye, explores the mythology in which all standards
of beauty in this country, i.e., blue eyes, blonde hair, and a creamy complexion, are completely
unattainable to black women. TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE (1970).
23. See generally Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in
Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (1990).
24. The Cosby Show's lack of controversy has caused much controversy. The Huxtable
family breaks through the stereotypes of black families: both parents are present and are pro-
fessionals in control of the household; the children are clean cut and offer less trouble than did
Bud on Father Knows Best. But the world offered up by Cosby:
is founded on assumptions of complete racial harmony and total integration.... [O]n
eighties television this idyllic conceit becomes little more than a monstrous blocking
mechanism. The characters seem incapable of imagining (much less experiencing)
racial adversity-even in a comic context. Black identity is reduced to a visual style,
a fashion statement.
Yet you can't help but wonder what would happen if the Cosby kids were to
wander beyond the confines of their plush prison of a home. Theo, for instance,
would most likely encounter whites who would see not a nice, well-mannered teen-
ager, but simply a black adolescent male-an object of almost instinctive white fear
and hatred. And what would happen when Vanessa tried to hail a taxi, only to be
ignored by cabbies fearful of ending up in a black neighborhood?
David Ehrenstein, The Color of Laughter, AM. FILM, Sept. 1988, 8-9.
25. Although The Cosby Show contains elements of this, and Bill Cosby's comedy has
long been "founded on a frank refusal to deal with racial difference-a refusal that whites
found utterly charming," the show features an almost exclusively black cast. Id. Thus the full
absurdity of the situation is not revealed as startlingly as it is in shows like Benson.
Consider Benson. There, the title character is a butler-turned-state-budget director who is
the voice of reason among an otherwise white cast of bumblers, who possess varying redeeming
qualities. While the sit-com occasionally dealt explicitly with race, it is the absence of the day-
to-day recognition of race that rings so false. For a variation on this theme, consider the sit-
coms Webster and Diff'rent Strokes. Both of these shows feature a sit-com standard: a very
small black child (or children as in the case of Diff'rent Strokes) living with a well-off white
family. Again, although these shows occasionally deal with racial issues in an explicit fashion,
[Vol. 42:51
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The silence with which the issues of race are dealt on these shows is par-
ticularly problematic. A minority living in a majority world is constantly
made conscious of race.26 Dealing with racial issues in a few, isolated
"theme" shows does nothing to address the myriad of mundane ways race
affects the life of a minority living in the majority world.
Television presents minorities with a distorted vision of themselves, and of
the majority community.27 However, in keeping with the focus of this Arti-
cle, the licensing of broadcast-television stations in the public interest-it is
the effect of this distorted depiction of minorities on the majority community
that is at issue here. The false depiction of minorities on television goes
virtually unchecked. For many majority Americans, the only time a minor-
ity enters their house is on television. Until the majority culture learns about
the minority culture, it is unlikely that the myriad "invisible" falsifications
will ever be recognized and corrected.2"
2. Ideas, Old Gossip, Oddments of All Things2 9
In a recent law review article, Professor Paulette Caldwell provides a good
example of the difficulties inherent in attempting to bring minority concerns
to the attention of the majority community. 0 Caldwell reflects upon the
those issues are ignored in nine episodes out of ten. Despite this pretense that race doesn't
matter in the life of a black child living with a white family (particularly in a Park Avenue
duplex as was the case in Diff'rent Strokes), the very premise of the show is that race does
matter. Why else would the show feature a black child living with a white family?
While the "black-child-living-with-white-family" construct is something of a sit-coin staple,
television has never featured any white children living with black families. Such a construct
would be as unthinkably threatening today as integrated schools were 40 years ago. See, e.g.,
Philip Elman & Norman Silber, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil
Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 825 (1987) (giving the
reaction of former Solicitor General Perlman to the Brown v. Board of Education case: "You
can't have little black boys sitting next to little white girls. The country isn't ready for that").
26. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race-Does the
Fundamental Contradiction have a Corollary?, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1988).
Minorities ... live in a world dominated by race. We experience racial treatment
every day of our lives. We are bathed in it. A high percentage of our social interac-
tion is tinged by it. And, when we meet with others of color, we trade stories of
racial treatment and how our friends are dealing with it. Race is a recurring reality
of our lives.
Id. at 407-08.
27. Minorities have greater exposure to information about the majority culture through
avenues other than television. In part due to the disparity in numbers between minority and
majority groups and in part due to the economic and political disparity between the groups, it
is far more difficult for minorities to avoid contact with members of the majority community
than vice versa.
28. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece. Perspectives on the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991).
29. EZRA POUND, Portrait D'une Femme, in SELECTED POEMS 16-17 (1957).
30. Caldwell, supra note 28.
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implications of Rogers v. American Airlines,31 in which a federal district
court upheld the categorical exclusion of braided hairstyles in the workplace.
She notes that "[h]air seems to be such a little thing. Yet it is the little
things, the small everyday realities of life, that reveal the deepest meanings
and values of a culture, give legal theory its grounding, and test its legiti-
macy."32  As Caldwell describes the personal connections she, as a black
woman, has to her hair and hair style, and the reactions of white and male
colleagues, it is clear that hairstyle is not "a little thing" at all. Rather, it is
critical not only to the way she sees herself, but also to the way others see
her and to the way she perceives that others see her.
Hair poses an easy case for misunderstanding. In addition to the meaning
attached to it by black women, hair has a distinct meaning in the majority
culture. But within the majority culture, the association is largely a frivo-
lous one: a concern over vanity. Contrast the meaning hair has for many in
the majority culture with the meaning it has for many black women: self
definition and a constant reminder of your inescapable difference from the
majority culture.33
Each of these two groups has a specific, and very different association with
hair. If a member of the majority group is presented with a case concerning
hair regulation, he may assume that his association with hair is the only
association involved, and decide that the complaint is a trivial one motivated
by concerns familiar to him (hair = vanity) rather than the concerns of the
minority group (hair = self-definition).
Where people have no pre-existing associations with terms, no assump-
tions are made regarding those terms. Contrast the situation described
above, where groups have different associations with a term, with the situa-
tion where the majority member has no association to the term. In the latter
context, the majority member may try to give content to what, to him, are
essentially unoccupied words-words with dictionary meanings but no per-
sonal associations. To find the content, the majority member may be com-
pelled to seek out the minority group's association. In such a situation there
is no displacement of associations, rather expansion and learning of new
ideas.
But until the majority community learns the importance of "a little thing"
like a hair regulation, it likely will continue to impose a "neutral" regulation,
which, colored by majority assumptions, may screen out minority concerns.
Our legal system gives power to certain people, drawn largely from the ma-
jority community, to promulgate, interpret and enforce laws and regulations.
31. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
32. Caldwell, supra note 28, at 370.
33. See generally Caldwell, supra note 28.
[Vol. 42:51
Regulation of Television in Public Interest
The efficacy of checks on whether those charged with exercising law-making
authority have done so in a non-discriminatory fashion, depend on a full
understanding of what might be discriminatory to the affected community.
If the majority community can come to understand the meaning of hair to
the minority community, it can incorporate that understanding into its defi-
nition of discriminatory behavior. 34 Although an understanding of the spe-
cific importance of hair may not come initially, or at all, when pieced
together, specific instances of cultural differences may, in the aggregate, lead
to the recognition of cultural differences." Some people, particularly law-
yers, are trained to recognize patterns. Most lawyers cannot predict what a
line of cases stands for by viewing only one case in isolation. Several related
cases must be laid out before a recognizable pattern emerges. Likewise, mi-
nority concerns must be viewed together in order to be understood.36
Decisions about discrimination often rest on unspoken cultural assump-
tions-not only about the group facing discrimination, but about the values
of the majority culture as well. These assumptions must be articulated
before they can be recognized and rectified.37
34. See infra text accompanying notes 38-57.
35. See infra part IV.
36. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Un-
derstandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39 (1991) (identifying common elements in scholarship of
minorities).
37. See, e.g., Edward de Grazia, I'm Just Going to Feed Adolphe, 3 CARDOZO STUD. IN L.
& LITERATURE 127, 145-46 (1991). In reviewing the liberation of literature from governmen-
tal censorship, de Grazia discusses the attitudes and ignorance of members of the Supreme
Court toward the books which gave rise to obscenity charges. The following quotation is from
a transcript of a discussion de Grazia had with Paul Bender, who clerked for Justice
Frankfurter:
The case involved what seemed to me to be a highly innocuous book, no pictures ....
a few dirty words .... I teased [Frankfurter] . . . about it.... [W]hy didn't he just
... say: "Come on, you can't ban this book!"
"What do you mean?" Frankfurter said.
"What's wrong with this book?"
"It's horrible filthy junk!"
"You don't know what you are talking about. It's nothing at all."
"No, no." he replied. "That's horrible stuff."
"Mr. Justice, you want to come with me to the street corner or the nearest drugstore.
I will go in there and buy you ten books on open sale that have equal contents. If
you don't believe me, ask Margy, my wife, she'll tell you!"
So he said: "What? She's seen that book?"
He was apoplectic about the fact that an innocent young woman like my wife should
see this, and I was telling him that he just didn't have the slightest idea of what the
sexual content of fiction was. He said: "I never read fiction. I don't have the time to
read fiction."
"Well, before you make judgments about this stuff why don't you give it a try?"
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The schism separating the majority and minority communities in the
United States sometimes seems so vast that constructing a bridge across it is
unimaginable. The schism is comprised of misunderstanding, fear and a
strong preference, on the part of the majority community, for the status quo.
B. On Creating Taste and Working Up an Appetite
Our country has recently begun to listen to, understand, and incorporate
voices from outside the mainstream of society."a Previously, we insisted on
the absorption of minority cultures into the majority culture before the
outside voices were to be heard.a9 The pre-assimilation assimilation require-
ment is often dressed up as an argument in favor of objective standards.
4
0
While objective standards do have merit, the objectivity of the majority com-
munity's standards is questionable. An examination of how preferences or
tastes are created helps to explain how standards are developed. The stan-
dards by which society measures the excellence of a thing, idea or person
are, in large part, dictated by its craving for certain tastes. Appreciation of
excellence is learned and developed.
1. Fear and Misunderstanding
Two barriers must be overcome before new tastes can be developed. The
first barrier is fear. As D.H. Lawrence described:
It is hard to hear a new voice, as hard as it is to listen to an un-
known language. We just don't listen....
Why?-Out of fear. The world fears a new experience more than it
fears anything. Because a new experience displaces so many old
Id. Bender, the law clerk, was an active participant in the culture of the day; Frankfurter was
entirely removed from it. Is Justice Frankfurter in a position to pass on the obscenity of a
book, where the definition of obscenity is as contextual as it is?
38. One example of the fairly recent incorporation of other cultures into mainstream
American culture can be seen in the world of condiments. On March 11, 1992, the New York
Times ran a front page article announcing that "[s]alsa toppled ketchup from the condiment
throne last year, signaling the rise of ethnic foods in the American diet." Condimental Drift,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1992, at Al. Salsa's eclipse of ketchup was attributed in part to Ameri-
can consumers being "open to novelty in ways that no other group has ever been." Molly
O'Neill, New Mainstream: Hot Dogs, Apple Pie and Salsa, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1992, at Cl.
The article noted that "[y]ou're not going to find Hispanics at Taco Bell. You'll find Hispanics
and other second-generation ethnics eating cheeseburgers at McDonald's." Id. Another news
story reporting on the rise of salsa noted that "[o]nly five years ago, ketchup was outselling
Mexican sauces by $200 million." Life: U.S. Pours on the Hot Stuff, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Feb. 21, 1992, at H3.
39. See generally SCHLESINGER, supra note 11.
40. See, e.g., id. at 53 ("'While a black scholar ... has a clear responsibility to join in
improving the society in which he lives, he must understand the difference between hard-
hitting advocacy on the one hand and the highest standards of scholarship on the other.'"
(quoting Professor John Hope Franklin)).
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experiences. And it is like trying to use muscles that have perhaps
never been used, or that have been going stiff for ages. It hurts
horribly.
The world doesn't fear a new idea. It can pigeon-hole any idea.
But it can't pigeon-hole a real new experience. It can only dodge.
41The world is a great dodger ....
New voices instill far more fear than new ideas because a novel voice may
force a reinterpretation of all old ideas and color the perception of all new
ideas. Consider, for example, the difficulty some minority legal scholars
have had in breaking into the canon of legal scholarship. Much of the schol-
arship by minority legal academics has been non-traditional in form and, as
such, slow to be accepted by majority scholars as falling within the ambit of
legal authority.4 2 In large measure, the non-traditional form of these pieces
has manifested itself by the injection of distinctly personal experiences into
legal analysis. Legal arguments are presented with a different voice.
"[T]hese authors.., have framed their arguments in very personal and un-
conventional terms. Dean [Derrick] Bell has turned into a novelist, whereas
part of the cogency of both Professor [Patricia] Williams' and Professor
[Charles] Lawrence's arguments stems from the unconventional beginning
41. D. H. Lawrence, The Spirit of Place, in 20TH CENTURY LITERARY CRITICISM: A
READER 122 (David Lodge, ed., 1972).
42. Obviously, this does not fully explain the difficulties minorities have had in being ac-
cepted into the legal canon. As there are fewer minority law faculty members than non-minor-
ity faculty members, in the aggregate, minorities produce less scholarship than non-minorities.
In fact, only 7.6 percent of all full-time law faculty are members of minority groups. John H.
Kennedy, The Law School Tenure Line, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 27, 1990, at 1 (reporting an
Association of American Law Schools survey).
Professor Leslie Espinoza argues that many of the scholarly articles by minorities in the
1970s were never incorporated into the debate on affirmative action because they:
were published in the Black Law Journal, which is not carried by either LEXIS or
Westlaw. The scholars who wrote these articles were not invited to present their
work at the more prestigious symposia on affirmative action .... They did not trade
reprints with scholars in the inner circle because they were not a part of it.
Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARv. L. REV.
1878, 1881, n.17 (1990).
In rebutting the assertion made by Professor Randall Kennedy in his controversial article,
Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989),
that these articles, 1) didn't exist and 2) if they did they were not worthy of citation, Espinoza
points out that there is another explanation for the absence of citations to these articles au-
thored by minorities in the works of majority scholars. She suggests that the habits of majority
scholars might lead them to "cite the most conveniently found, prestigiously placed, familiar,
and similar works. Subtle barriers create a cycle of exclusion." Id. at 1881.
Further, many minority members of law faculties made their marks through litigation rather
than theoretical expositions. Jerome M. Culp, Toward a Black Legal Scholarship, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 39, 50 (1991) (stating that "Black legal scholars ... were constantly drawn away from
developing ... a legal scholarship by the pull to participate in the struggle of Black Americans
for 'equal justice under the law' ").
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or structure of their arguments."43 In the works of these scholars, new and
not-so-new ideas are presented through the recounting of very personal ex-
periences.' Those personal experiences are very new to those who have
never had them. A common reaction to an alien experience is to reject it as
unimaginable. 4 Denial is a frequently employed defense to a new experi-
ence that would otherwise force the re-thinking of a life. New experiences
and new voices force reconsideration of the status quo.
But a single idea, expressed in a familiar voice can be catalogued within an
existing perspective. The fear barrier can be overcome. As Lawrence sug-
gests, we are already equipped with the ability to listen to new voices. He
speaks of "trying to use muscles that have perhaps never been used, or that
have been going stiff for ages."46 Those muscles exist but have simply not
been called upon to function for a long time. Thus, he describes the process
of learning to listen to new voices as one that stretches us, but not beyond
our nascent capabilities.
Even if fear of the new or strange is conquered, significant communication
problems remain. The second barrier, perhaps an outgrowth of the fear of
43. Culp, supra note 42, at 95.
44. See, e.g., Book Note, The Stories of Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 779 (1992) (reviewing
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)). After reporting some
of Williams' observations, the reviewer notes that:
[r]educed to their essence, Williams's positions on most legal controversies echo the
works of many other scholars. Although her solutions to legal problems are not
purely original, Williams's interpretative approach brings to these arguments a com-
plexity of meaning and a space for the reader's own involvement in imagining alter-
native solutions that is unique to more literary genres of writing.
Id. at 782. The reviewer goes on to conclude that Williams' choice of storytelling and her
deliberate invitations to the reader to interpret and fill in the interstices of her writing with the
reader's experience offers "a new outlook on old problems." Id. at 784. Some part of the text
must be familiar to the reader in order for the reader to understand the author. The telling of
stories about "old problems" may bring the "old problems" into a newer light if the stories are
familiar or "ring true" to the reader.
45. Professor Richard Delgado tells the following story:
Recently, a law professor at an eminent school where I gave a talk mentioned in the
discussion period that he had asked a Hispanic student for an example of how racism
affected her. She said that few people held doors open for her. The region in which
the school is located has a tradition of courtesy; people open doors for each other.
The professor, who was white, was surprised and skeptical of the student's as-
sertions....
Delgado, supra note 26, at 409.
In teaching Andrea Dworkin's short story, bertha schneiders existential edge, which re-
counts the life story of a victim of domestic violence, several students invariably reject the
story as "false" or "wrong." For many of my students, the experiences suffered by bertha
schneider are inconceivable and therefore, the story she tells, and her reactions to the domestic
violence are unacceptable as true. Andrea Dworkin, bertha schneiders existential edge, in THE
NEW WOMANS BROKEN HEART 6-11 (1986).
46. Lawrence, supra note 41, at 122.
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new voices, is misunderstanding. Different cultures have different standards
of beauty and different definitions of truth, all of which are culturally
determined:
[T]he concept of truth is intimately linked to the biases of forms of
expression. Truth does not, and never has, come unadorned. It
must appear in its proper clothing or it is not acknowledged, which
is a way of saying that the "truth" is a kind of cultural prejudice.
Each culture conceives of it as being most authentically expressed
in certain symbolic forms that another culture may regard as triv-
ial or irrelevant.4 7
When a truth is adorned by the trappings of an alien culture, the majority
culture may misunderstand the message because of the trappings. Subse-
quently, the truth is never reached as a result of the trappings.
The selection of a medium to convey ideas is culturally determined. This
is illustrated, quite literally, by the use of different languages around the
world. For example, to someone only slightly schooled in French, the use of
proper French grammar is a nuance that is virtually meaningless. Not so to
a fluent French-speaker. Not only is proper grammar noticed, but such a
nuance may negatively alter the fluent French-speaker's assessment of the
content of the message. The wrapping, as well as the content, are examined.
Sometimes ignorance prevents one from passing by the wrapping to the con-
tent, as is the case with someone who knows no French. Sometimes igno-
rance prevents one from totally unwrapping the message (as is the case with
the person with only a marginal command of French). However, sometimes
a cultural nuance is flat-out misunderstood and, much to the shock of the
sender of the message, the recipient is infuriated. The situation becomes
increasingly problematic when the misunderstanding is not recognized. In
such an instance, the parties may proceed as though the meaning was clearly
calculated to offend.4" To avoid such a situation, the parties must learn
more about each other.
Another kind of misunderstanding derives from overly-zealous attempts
to understand. Professors Trina Grillo and Stephanie Wildman explore the
problem of the "analogizer"-someone who "believes that her situation is
47. POSTMAN, supra note 2, at 22, 23.
48. See, e.g., People v. Poddar, 103 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Ct. App. 1972), rev'd on other grounds,
518 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1974). The Appellant, a University of California at Berkeley student from
India of the Harijan caste (the untouchables) killed a fellow student by the name of Tanya
Tarasoff. Id. at 86. He thought a romantic relationship had formed because they had kissed
on New Year's Eve; she, an American eighteen-year-old assumed nothing of the sort. Appel-
lant's counsel sought to introduce the testimony of an anthropologist as to the cultural strain
he was under in conducting male-female relationships. The court did not allow the testimony.
Id. at 88.
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the same as another's. ,49 Analogies may lead to false understanding because
the analogizer has skimmed past the difference between herself and the other
person. For example, there is a strong tendency to analogize sexism to ra-
cism. However, simply because sexism is understood, that does not neces-
sarily mean that the nuances of racism have been perceived. Thus, the
analogy of sexism to racism leads to marginalization and obscuring of ra-
cism.5° An explicit recognition of differences is critical to understanding dif-
ferences as well as similarities between the minority and majority
communities in this country.
The art of analogizing is critical to the legal process. It is how lawyers
and judges distinguish cases. But analogizing in the dark may be rife with
pitfalls. "The decision to liken one instance to another, or to distinguish
them, turns on a judgment of what differences and similarities are most sig-
nificant to the moral beliefs at stake." 5' In order to analogize properly, a
judge must be able to recognize all of the moral beliefs at stake. An ability to
recognize the values of others is learned and developed, not innate.
2. Repetition: Reducing Taste to a Heartbeat
If one who is unfamiliar and unschooled looks at the work of someone
with an alien perspective, she sees everything from her own perspective.
52
This individual's point of view necessarily includes values drawn from, and
honed on, things with which the individual is familiar. When examining
foreign work, one tends to measure and judge it by the standards of the
49. Trina Grilo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Impli-
cations of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J.
397, 398 (1991).
50. Id. at 399.
51. ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 258 (1975); see supra text accom-
panying notes 33-37.
52. There has been a good deal written about the lack of perspective in history. See, e.g.,
Kenneth S. Lynn, Speaking for Whitman, in THE AIR-LINE TO SEATTLE: STUDIES IN LITER-
ARY AND HISTORICAL WRITING ABOUT AMERICA 34 (1983). Lynn's essays are full of notes
"correcting" accounts marred by the telling of history through contemporary lenses. His the-
sis is that historical perspective is easily forgotten when we cannot think in the way that the
subject of our discourse thinks. It is difficult to shake the cloak of today when writing about
yesterday. It is only by immersing ourselves in the past that we can see how life was in the
past.
Although many of our professional judges and critics are able to understand societal
changes over time by gaining historical perspectives, they are unable to transcend their per-
sonal cultural experiences. Our Judges have not been raised in a multi-cultural fashion and
hence, have difficulty evaluating and valuing the virtues or the vices of diversity. Their inter-
pretation of the "other" is informed, in large part, by its otherness and subsequently they
approach such things as strange or foreign (and therefore "wrong").
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familiar work.53 The more familiar the foreign work becomes, the more
readily it is incorporated into one's value system. Eventually, what was once
unfamiliar becomes customary and new work is measured against it.
If one is repeatedly exposed to the same work, she is inclined to have a
disproportionately great opinion of the work and its place in history. She
will compare all else to the work. Consider the following quotation from
Kenneth Lynn:
The influence of Adventures of Huckleberry Finn on American cul-
ture has been enormous. Consider Hemingway's tribute: "All
modem American literature comes from one book by Mark Twain
called Huckleberry Finn." The main reason, however, why this
book has come to play such a major role in our cultural life is that
students repeatedly run into it in the course of their formal educa-
tion. They read it, usually for the first time, in a high school Eng-
lish class. Then they read it again during their freshman year in
college, in a general education course entitled something like "The
Hero in Western Thought." If, as sophomores, they elect to take
the survey course in American literature, they unquestionably will
be asked to read it once more. 4
Standards of taste may be created by repetition, particularly in foras that
command attention. 5 Broadcast television plays a uniquely influential role
in American society. People watch a mind-boggling number of hours of tele-
vision a day, and often fail to distinguish between it and reality.56 However,
53. Law reviews, for example, are ranked hierarchically, largely based on the number of
citations to them by the Supreme Court and other law review articles. The more frequently an
article or a law review is cited, the higher up in the hierarchy it is ranked. The higher up it is
ranked, the better authority it is. The better the authority, the more frequent the citations to
it. Thus, it is a wholly circular exercise. See, e.g., Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty Scholar-
ship Survey, 65 CHI-KENT L. REV. 195 (1989).
This does not suggest that there is no basis for a hierarchy. I believe such excellence can be
determined, but some of the traditional methods for making such judgements should be ques-
tioned. My call for the majority gaining access to minority voices involves redefining stan-
dards which recognize excellence in ways other than those exclusively recognized by the
majority culture.
54. Kenneth S. Lynn, Welcome Back From the Raft, Huck Honeyl, in THE AIR-LINE TO
SEATTLE, supra note 52, at 40.
55. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOEBBELS, THE EARLY GOEBBELS DIARIES (Helmut Heiber, ed. &
Oliver Watson, trans., 1962) (asserting that if you repeat a lie often enough people will believe
it).
Happily, there are exceptions to that rule. Some ideas, things and people are deemed "bad"
by society and no amount of exposure will make the public crave them. Simple exposure is not
always enough. Some things to which we are repeatedly exposed are simply, and by any stan-
dard, bad. In the marketing context, the Edsel stands out. Similarly, some ideas, things and
people are "good" and regardless of the amount of exposure, their innate quality makes them
"classics."
56. See generally POSTMAN, supra note 2.
1992]
Catholic University Law Review
at present, broadcast television offers little by way of minority voices." And
so it fails to serve the public interest in greater understanding within society.
Exposing the majority culture to objects, people or ideas, which it would
otherwise reject because of their novelty or strangeness, will create familiar-
ity with such objects, people or ideas. This exposure and resultant familiar-
ity will lessen fears and promote understanding. Some amount of strife will
continue, and some will even be aggravated by increased exposure. Never-
theless, exposing the majority culture to diverse minority viewpoints will
alter the majority's focus and decrease both its inclination to automatically
reject, or the likelihood of its misunderstanding, new and seemingly strange
ideas. Instead, minority perspectives will be incorporated into the very
values and judgments that inform the majority culture's taste. This incorpo-
ration, in turn, will lead the majority culture to desire what was once fright-
ening and/or misunderstood. In order for these changes in majority-culture
thinking to occur, it is essential that the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, which is charged with regulating television in the public interest, do so
in a manner that is consistent with these fear-breaking, knowledge-creating,
taste-making ideals.
III. THE REGULATION OF BROADCASTING: DETERMINING THE PUBLIC
INTEREST THE FCC WAY
Television did not develop into a watchable and commercial medium until
the mid-1920s." Even then, it was technically crude. Notwithstanding this
poor quality, the promise of television created a "mad scramble to get on the
air;" the lack of regulation led to "a broadcast of bedlam."
59
This bedlam required, at a minimum, regulation of frequencies so stations
would not broadcast over one another. Although the infant industry had
been regulated first by the Radio and Wireless Act of 1912 and then by the
Radio Act of 1927, neither statute provided for the increasing complexity
and demand of the broadcasting industry.6° In response, Congress passed
57. See supra text accompanying notes 13-28.
58. In 1927, television pictures had 48-line definition. The standard in the United States
today is 525 lines. Outside of the U.S., the standard number of lines is 625. High Definition
Television, which is technically feasible, offers 1125-line definition. As the number of lines
increases, so does the clarity of the picture. So, even setting aside the nagging question of
whether there is anything worth watching on television, a problem which continues to plague
us today, actually watching television in 1927 was irritating because of the constant flickering
and the crude, blurred images. ROBERT H. STERN, THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COM-
MISSION AND TELEVISION 46 (1979).
59. E.P. HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 160 (1936)
(quoted in STERN, supra note 58, at 70).
60. The early, experimental years of television were regulated by a succession of Acts
which were extremely limited in scope. Radio Act of 1912, Ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed
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the Communications Act of 1934, creating the Federal Communications
Commission, an independent agency comprised of five commissioners, and
delegated to it the power to regulate broadcasting for "public convenience,
interest or necessity."6 The Communications Act of 1934, which still gov-
erns broadcasting today, is a clear example of Congress perceiving the need
for regulation but not yet recognizing the substantive contours of such
regulation.
The breadth of this grant of power-to regulate "in the public interest"-
is vast, but it has withstood judicial challenge.62 In FCC v. Pottsville Broad-
casting Co. ,63 Justice Frankfurter found the "public interest" touchstone to
be as:
concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of
delegated authority permit[;] it serves as a supple instrument for
the exercise of discretion by the expert body which Congress has
charged to carry out its legislative policy. Necessarily, therefore,
the subordinate questions of procedure in ascertaining the public
interest, when the Commission's licensing authority is invoked...
1927) and the Radio Act of 1927, Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934). The Radio Act of
1912 established call letters for government radio stations, assigned frequencies and required
that radio operators obtain licenses from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The Radio
Act of 1927 established the Federal Radio Commission ("FRC") to oversee broadcasting, § 3,
44 Stat. at 1162. The FRC was empowered by the statute to assign wave-lengths to licensees
based on "public convenience, interest, or necessity" and designate the power and location of
transmitters. § 4, 44 Stat. at 1163.
FM radio had recently been "invented," but it was not yet available. And television, despite
the experimental transmission in 1927, had retreated to the laboratories at the time of the
passage of the Communications Act of 1934. STERN, supra note 58, at 135.
61. "The Commission, if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby,
subject to the limitations of this Act, shall grant to any applicant therefore, a station license
provided for by this Act." 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1988); see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
62. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
Arguments over interpretation of how much authority Congress delegated to the FCC to
regulate broadcasting in "the public interest," 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 301, 303, 307, 309 (1982 ed.),
continue to this day. Some contend that this country does not have a strong taste for govern-
ment regulation and that "the chief public responsibility of a broadcaster in the eyes of Con-
gress was to avoid interfering electrically with another broadcaster." DAVID POTTER, The
Historical Perspective, in THE MEANING OF COMMERCIAL TELEVISION 58 (Stanely T. Don-
ner, ed., 1966).
Others find the charge to license in "the public interest" to be a broad delegation of power,
which gives the FCC the right to mandate everything from technical to programming stan-
dards. This second group recognizes that the Congress had no way of knowing what television
would become when it passed the Communications Act of 1934, and acknowledges the exper-
tise of an agency in determining matters within its special area of expertise, particularly in a
world with changing technology. See, e.g., Pottsville Broadcasting, 309 U.S. at 138.
63. 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
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were explicitly and by implication left to the Commission's own
devising. 4
The significance of the Pottsville decision is that the FCC, a presidentially-
appointed independent agency, 65 has been given the difficult charge of defin-
ing the public interest as it relates to broadcasting. It is clear that since the
Pottsville decision, the Commission's definitions have failed to account for
the importance of presenting minority voices to the majority. 66 Similarly, it
is manifest that the content given to the "public interest" standard by the
FCC and the courts has failed to keep pace with congressional findings about
the importance of minority voices to the majority.67
Some of this neglect or oversight 6s of minority voices is inherent in the
nature of an administrative agency, which, unlike a legislative body, is not
accountable to voters. Voter accountability ensures greater responsiveness
to changing demographic patterns and minority concerns than is found in
administrative agencies.69
From this perspective, the FCC is ill-equipped to provide a complete defi-
nition of the "public interest."7° The FCC's characteristics-it is a non-
64. Id. at 138.
65. The five FCC Commissioners serve for five-year terms. They are appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. No more than three of the five commis-
sioners may be members of the same political party. 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), (b)(5) (1991).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 90-142.
67. See infra part IV.
68. These terms-neglect and oversight-may understate the problem. Making a case for
"agency capture" is not difficult with respect to the FCC. From its earliest decisions concern-
ing the adoption of uniform technical standards (RCA's were chosen much to the disappoint-
ment of entrepreneurs that had developed different standards) to the history of television-
station license renewals (every single license up for renewal has been granted) to the recent
"relaxation" of the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules (they are toothless now), the FCC
has, historically, strongly favored the industry "players." See generally STERN, supra note 58.
69. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1976), serves as an emblematic
effort by Congress to end disenfranchisement of minorities in this country. See also Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding the Act as a legitimate exercise of power
under the Fifteenth Amendment).
The federal judiciary is subject to the same critique as administrative agencies. In the case
of the judiciary though, the accountability and representation issues are even more acute than
with the agencies. See Dwight L. Greene, Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance and
the Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostic v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming June
1993) (detailing racial, economic and ethnic composition of courts and the attendant
implications.)
70. As noted, infra text accompanying notes 78-102, the FCC must cope with competing
values in defining the contours of its charge to regulate in the public interest. This is not to
suggest that the FCC should consider the addition of minority voices to the spectrum to be the
single or even paramount concern in determining the public interest. Rather, the FCC should
recognize the importance of adding minority voices as a vital aspect of the public interest that
may be given consideration in consonance with other values, such as the First Amendment,
which combine to inform a definition of the public interest.
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elected presidentially-appointed body-stands in the way of its recognition
of minority concerns or voices, so even when it attempts diversification of
the airwaves in the "public interest," it fails. 71 Furthermore, its historic
composition---commissioners have primarily been drawn from the majority
group-exacerbates its inability to effectively diversify the airwaves.72 Re-
duced to essentials: The FCC is comprised of members of the majority
group. Members of the majority group are unlikely to be able to recognize
minority concerns and be influenced by them until the barriers of fear and
misunderstanding are broken down and an appetite for new ideas has been
whetted. Until that day, it remains unlikely that FCC commisioners will
recognize the need to regulate according to a definition of the "public inter-
est" that includes the entire public.
Contrast the FCC with the Congress. The House of Representatives is
subject to frequent elections from 435 single-member districts.
73 It is popu-
lated by a number of minority members and a larger number of non-minor-
ity members dependent on minority votes for reelection.74 Of course, any
given committee may be underrepresentative of these interests, but com-
pared to the insulation of the FCC, Congress, even in committee form, is
structured to be more responsive to minority concerns.7 5
71. For a discussion of various regulations designed to diversify the air waves, see infra
text accompanying notes 104-13.
72. There have been few FCC Commissioners and Hearing Examiners drawn from minor-
ity groups. Most notably, former-NAACP president, Benjamin L. Hooks was appointed to the
FCC by President Nixon. However, such appointments are the exception rather than the rule.
Since the FCC's inception, there have been only three black persons-Andrew C. Barrett,
Tyrone Brown and Benjamin L. Hooks-and only two persons of Hispanic origin- Patricia
Diaz Dennis and Henry M. Rivera-to serve as FCC Commissioners. See Andrew Barrett
Confirmed As FCC Commissioner, JET, June 18, 1990, at 38; FCC EEO Conference: Women
Gaining in Broadcast and Cable to Detriment of Minority Males, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 24, 1989,
at 4; Renee E. Warren, Blacks See Hope In New FCC Appointment, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Feb.
1990, at 32.
73. The Senate, with its 100 members each serving six-year terms, tends to be less repre-
sentational than the House. Indeed, 1992 saw the first election of a black female U.S. Senator.
Nevertheless, as elected officials, members of the Senate are accountable to their voters.
74. The spate of legislation introduced by Congress to diversify voices in broadcasting
may be a result of this structural difference. See, e.g., DONALD E. LIVELY, MODERN COMMU-
NICATIONS LAW 401 (1991) (discussing Congress' attempt to enact the Fairness Doctrine into
law-vetoed by lame-duck President Reagan-and the FCC's subsequent disavowal of Fair-
ness Doctrine); see also Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1989) (prohibiting FCC re-examination of its preference policies based on
race, ethnicity or gender). But see Notice of Inquiry on Racial, Ethnic, or Gender Classifica-
tions, 1 FCC Rcd. 1315 (1986), modified, 2 FCC Rd. 2377 (1987) (soliciting comments on
race-neutral alternatives to preference policies).
75. Of course, some committees are more powerful than others. See generally ABNER
MIKVA & ERIC LANE, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (forthcoming, 1993).
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The potential for lack of representativeness on a congressional committee,
and Congress' attendant accountability as demonstrated during the Thomas-
Hill hearings, offers a good illustration of the fundamental difference be-
tween elected and appointed officials working in small groups. Initially, the
Judiciary Committee, comprised entirely of white males, failed to take seri-
ously Professor Hill's statements about Clarence Thomas. However, when
the statements were leaked to the press and to those to whom the Committee
Members were accountable, the Committee took action.76 In some skewed
sense, the re-opening of the Thomas hearings is an example of the accounta-
bility of Congress at work even in small committee groups. Certainly, the
accountability of these men to their constituents played a role in the re-open-
ing of the hearings. And just as certainly, the racial and gender make-up of
the Judiciary Committee played a role in its initial failure to consider seri-
ously Professor Hill's statements. Without public pressure and the account-
ability of elected office, the members of that Committee may not have even
known what they were overlooking.77 The same problems inhere in the
FCC determining what is in the "public interest." The FCC is a small group
and lacks the accountability controls placed upon elected officials.
A. The Scope of the FCC's Power to Determine the Public Interest
The public interest in diversifying the airwaves comes from the perception
of broadcasting as a powerful medium that gives its speakers great access to
the public.7" Further, the public interest requirement is born of the recogni-
tion that the public benefits from a robust and healthy marketplace of ideas,
and that a healthy marketplace will not come about unless diverse perspec-
76. See Fred Strasser, Committee Handled the Allegations by the Book, but Not Aggres-
sively, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 21, 1991, at 14.
77. For example, Senator Biden's claim that he did not pursue Professor Hill's statement
because she had indicated that she did not want this to be public is a good illustration of
majority-group stereotyping displacing the ability to receive information from a member of a
minority group. Senator Biden may have assumed that this was about sex, not harassment or
character. So when Professor Hill requested that the matter be kept private, he may have
displaced her desires and values with his assumption that women do not want to talk about sex
in public. Newspaper reports indicate that Hill initially requested confidentiality but agreed to
the use of her name four days before the first set of hearings began. Id.
78. See, e.g., Richard E. Wiley, Federal Regulation of Network Practices, in NETWORK
TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 107 (Michael Botein & David M. Rice, eds., 1980)
(answering questions about why so much government attention is paid to the broadcast televi-
sion industry by noting "television's presumed power as a medium of entertainment and infor-
mation, and . . .many people's belief that this power is unduly concentrated in the three
networks"); see also Oscar G. Chase, Broadcast Regulation and the First Amendment, in NET-
WORK TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra, at 137 ("A major goal of government
regulation has been diversity of programming-the notion that the airwaves should not be the
exclusive personal podiums of the licensees but should be used to bring a wide range of ideas
and experiences from many sources to the American people.").
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tives have access to the air.7 9 The FCC has implemented a variety of regula-
tions to accomplish the goal of diversifying the airwaves. 80 However, each
attempt to add diversity invariably brings the regulation into conflict with
other aspects of the "public interest."
This section discusses the various regulations promulgated by the FCC in
the interest of diversifying broadcasting and the courts' interpretations of
them. The inability of the FCC and courts to identify the very minority
voices the FCC regulations direct them to seek out, has led to a failure to
achieve diversity with respect to minorities.
1. Establishing the Power
The Supreme Court thwarted initial attempts to expand the meaning of
regulation in the "public interest." In FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Sta-
tion,81 the Court decided that the 1934 Communications Act did not permit
the FCC to give weight to the economic impact on an existing licensee in its
determination of whether to award a new license.
The policy of the Act is clear that no person is to have anything in
the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a li-
cense. Licenses are limited to a maximum of three years' duration,
may be revoked, and need not be renewed....
Plainly it is not the purpose of the Act to protect a licensee against
competition but to protect the public.82
While Sanders Brothers articulated the position that the FCC grants licenses
to serve the public, and not to protect the licensee's business interests, the
case also placed explicit limits on the FCC's authority to regulate in the
public interest. The Court stated that "the Act does not assay to regulate the
business of the licensee. The Commission is given no supervisory control of
the programs, of business management or of policy. ' '8 3 The Court drew its
narrow reading of the FCC's authority from the history of the 1934 Commu-
nications Act, noting that "[t]he fundamental purpose of Congress in respect
of broadcasting was the allocation and regulation of the use of radio frequen-
cies by prohibiting such use except under license."
84
79. See infra text accompanying notes 107-16; see generally Andrea L. Johnson, Redefin-
ing Diversity in Telecommunications: Uniform Regulatory Framework for Mass Communica-
tions, 26 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 87, 122-29 (1992) (arguing that unregulated telecommunications
marketplace fails to fulfill its goals).
80. See, e.g., Licensing regulations, multiple ownership rules, minority distress sale poli-
cies, discussed infra text accompanying notes 89-135.
81. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
82. Id. at 475.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 474.
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Two years later, in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,85 the
Supreme Court reconsidered its position and declared:
The Act itself establishes that the Commission's powers are not
limited to the engineering and technical aspects of regulation of
radio communication .... [T]he Act does not restrict the Com-
mission merely to the supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the
Commission the burden of determining the composition of that
traffic. The facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate
all who wish to use them. 6
The Court reasoned that because the FCC had to supervise traffic over the
air when faced with competing applications for the same frequency, it had to
choose among them. This was to be done by reference to "[t]he touchstone
provided by Congress[,] ... the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity,'
... a criterion which 'is as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment
in such a field of delegated authority permit.' 87 Since National Broadcast-
ing Co., the authority of the FCC has steadily expanded.
Once the Court established that the "public interest" rubric authorized
the FCC to do more than play traffic cop in the air, the next step was to
determine the shape the power would take.8 Early on, the FCC, courts and
Congress indicated a concern that voices heard, and images seen, through
broadcasting be diverse.
B. Regulation of Ownership
The principal means of regulating broadcasting is through ownership of
stations. First Amendment values prevent extensive regulation of program
content.8 9 This section explores those controls on ownership and licensing
85. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
86. Id. at 215-16.
87. Id. at 216 (quoting Pottsville Broadcasting, 309 U.S. at 138).
88. Although the "public interest" standard is applied to the regulation of all aspects of
broadcasting-from technical standards to the determination of locations for new stations,-
this Article does not cover those aspects of the FCC's regulation in the "public interest."
89. Spectrum scarcity naturally clashes with the First Amendment: "Where there are sub-
stantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is
idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of
every individual to speak, write, or publish." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 388 (1969). Although the First Amendment is given less weight in broadcasting than in
print media, it still prevents the FCC from becoming overly-involved in content regulation.
See generally LIVELY, supra note 74. Further, the recent Supreme Court decision in R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (striking down St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordi-
nance as violative of First Amendment), indicates the Court's increasingly protective posture
towards First Amendment values; see also Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 326
(1988) (providing in relevant part, that "[n]othing in this chapter shall ... give the Commis-
sion the power of censorship over.., any radio station, and no regulation ... shall be promul-
gated by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech").
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of broadcast stations, which are designed to diversify the airwaves. The vari-
ous regulations on ownership and licensing range from subtle and minor
controls, which have little effect, to more intrusive and dramatic controls
with absolute effects.
Regulations governing diversification of control of the mass media are
designed to guard against the feared formation of a natural monopoly,90 and
to expand the number of voices with access to the airwaves.91 Multiple
Ownership Rules92 limit the number of television stations owned by any one
entity to twelve. 93 Further limits are placed on television ownership in the
event that the total audience reach of the stations exceeds 25 percent of the
United States.94 However, if "at least two of the stations in which [group
owners] hold cognizable interests are minority controlled," then "group
owners of television and radio stations... [may] utilize a maximum numeri-
cal cap of 14 stations." 95 Minority control is defined as "more than 50 per-
cent owned by one or more members of a minority group." 96 Minority
90. Concern over the monopolistic tendencies that were developing alongside the new
technology pre-dated television.
Ever since the early 1920's, when Congress had first begun to interest itself seri-
ously in the affairs of radio, some legislators had manifested considerable concern
over the concentration of economic power in the radio industry. This concern was
markedly evident in the long series of hearings and debates preceding the passage of
the Radio Act of 1927.
STERN, supra note 58, at 60 n.35.
For further discussion of broadcasting becoming a natural monopoly, see, e.g., FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940); National Citizens Comm. for Broad-
casting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 436 U.S.
775 (1978); 67 CONG. REC. 12503 (1926) (remarks of Sen. Howell during debates on Radio
Act of 1927).
91. As to the goal of diversifying viewpoints through diversification of ownership, see,
e.g., Committee for Community Access v. FCC, 737 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[T]he
operating presumption has long been that as diversity of ownership increases, diversity of view-
points expands. This criterion thus allows the FCC to assess the likelihood that a broadcaster
will present diverse views, without having to assay the actual diversity of the views
themselves.").
92. In re Amendment of § 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Own-
ership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Report & Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 (1985)
[hereinafter 1984 Multiple Ownership Rules]. These limits on the number of stations that any
one entity may own have steadily evolved since the 1940s. The first Rules limited ownership to
three stations of each media type, then, for a long time, owners were limited to seven of each
media type. Multiple Ownership Rules, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953). However, the limits placed by
the rules are presumptive and may be waived if the "public interest" so requires. United States
v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
93. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1)(iii) (Supp. 1992).
94. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(2)(ii) (1991).
95. 100 F.C.C.2d 74, para. 45 (1985).
96. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(3)(iii) (1991).
1992]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 42:51
groups are defined as "Black, Hispanic, American Indian, Alaska Native,
Asian and Pacific Islander."'9 "
Although this exception to the Multiple Ownership Rules' twelve-station
limit is designed to encourage minority joint-ventures with majority owners,
it fails to achieve its purpose. The rule, as written, contemplates no distinc-
tions between these designated minority groups. In theory, diversity may be
achieved by adding only one minority group's voice. In addition, although
the rules specify the percentage of minority ownership, there are no guards
against "sham" minority ownership.98
Furthermore, one can argue about whether the fifty-percent controlling
interest, even if legitimate, guarantees the addition of a minority voice to the
airwaves. The majority group must listen to and incorporate minority
voices, which it has failed to do in the past because of its inability or unwill-
ingness to let minorities speak on their own, without interference. 9 If the
minority owner has but a fifty-percent controlling interest in a station,1°°
97. Id. at § 73.3555(d)(3)(iv).
98. See infra text and notes at 113-14.
99. See supra part II.
100. On this point, the Congressional Research Service ("CRS") analysis of the FCC's
statistical data with respect to programming aimed at minority groups by various station own-
ership groups is somewhat instructive. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, Mi-
nority Broadcast Station Ownership and Broadcast Programming: Is There a Nexus? (June 29,
1988) [hereinafter CRS REPORT]. The CRS Report indicates that the greater the percentage of
a given minority group's ownership of a station, the greater the percentage of programming
targeted at that minority group. For example, 65 percent of all broadcast stations with over
one percent black ownership, broadcast black programming. The CRS Report breaks down
the black ownership into two categories: Stations with between 1 and 50 percent black owner-
ship and those with 51 percent black ownership or more. Sixty percent of all stations with 1-
50 percent black ownership broadcast black programming. Of those stations with 51 percent
or more black ownership, 79 percent broadcast black programming. The statistics are similar
with respect to Hispanics. For stations with 1-50 percent hispanic ownership, 53 percent
broadcast hispanic programming, whereas of those stations with 51 percent or more hispanic
ownership, 74 percent broadcast hispanic programming. With respect to asian/pacific pro-
gramming, contrast the broadcasting practices of the stations with 1-50 percent asian/pacific
ownership: they broadcast 14 percent asian/pacific programming, whereas the stations with 51
percent or more asian/pacific ownership, broadcast 25 percent asian/pacific programming. In
the american indian/native alaskan ownership groups, of those stations with 1-50 percent
american indian/native alaskan ownership, 23 percent of the programming is american in-
dian/native alaskan programming; in contrast, of those stations with 51 percent or greater
american indian/native alaskan ownership, 46 percent of the programming is categorized as
american indian/native alaskan ownership. CRS REPORT, Figures 5A, 6A, 7A, 8A.
The CRS Report includes commercial and non-commercial radio and television stations and
does not break down ownership groups into sufficiently precise groups to be truly helpful. The
Report does, however, paint a broad picture of the effect of ownership on programming. Be-
cause the figures within the ownership categories are not sufficiently refined, the CRS Report
cannot be used to predict whether raising the 50-percent minority-ownership level to, say 75 or
100 percent, would make a difference in programs aired. As most of the stations surveyed
were commercial, at some point, the owners' responsiveness to its audience may suggest trim-
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experience suggests that the minority will be the one adapting to the major-
ity discourse rather than the other way around.'01
The Multiple Ownership Rules may be an effective way to prevent concen-
tration of media power. However, they are not an effective way to encourage
minority voices to enter into the majority's world. Preventing monopolies
and aggregations of power is not the same as "promot[ing] diversification of
ownership in order to maximize diversification of ... viewpoints.'
10 2
1. Diversifying When "They All Look Alike"
Under the Multiple Ownership Rules, a minority controlling-interest
comprised of any combination of the designated minority groups 10 3 will sat-
isfy the exception and permit the ownership of up to two additional stations
in each category. But members of the diverse minority groups the FCC has
identified-Blacks, Hispanics," American Indians, Alaska Natives and Pa-
cific Islanders-are likely to share but one thing in common: disenfranchise-
ment. Yet even with respect to disenfranchisement, the history of these
groups is radically different. To members of the majority culture who lack
knowledge of minority groups, their history, and their culture, minority
groups are interchangeable and so any combination of these groups may
form a block to represent "the minority perspective." This policy is flawed
because there is no single minority perspective that intelligently crosses over
all of these groups."°5 The view of minority groups as interchangeable is as
pervasive in this country as it is oppressive.1
0 6
ming back on minority programming. This is likely to be even truer with respect to television
stations than it is for radio stations, as the stakes are higher (television stations cost substan-
tially more money than do radio stations) and the audiences tend to be broader than radio.
101. Michel Foucault argues that the discourse of power, that is, the voice of the majority,
is so ingrained in our consciousness that it is impossible for anyone to be free of it. "But I wish
to know how the reflexivity of the subject and the discourse of truth are linked-'How can the
subject tell the truth about itself?'-and I think that relations of power existing themselves
upon one another constitute one of the determin[ants] .... MICHEL FOUCAULT, POLITICS,
PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE 39 (Lawrence D. Kritzman, ed. & Alan Sheridan et al., trans., 1988).
102. Multiple Ownership Rules, 18 F.C.C. 288, 291 (1953).
103. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
104. Hispanics are defined as those with "hispanic surnames" for the purposes of Compar-
ative Hearings, Distress Sale Policies, and Tax Certificate Policies based on race, ethnicity or
gender. In re Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, Policy Statement, 68 F.C.C.2d 979,
980 n.8 (1978).
105. The controlling minority interest may be from one such group, in which case this
argument is not relevant to that specific case. The observation stands, however, as an indica-
tion of the FCC's view of minorities and as a possible means of adding minority voices to the
broadcast air waves.
106. For example, essentialist critiques of Feminist Theory abound. Professor Angela Har-
ris, among others, has written about "[t]he need for multiple consciousness in feminist move-
ment .... Since the beginning of the feminist movement in the United States, black women
have been arguing that their experience calls into question the notion of a unitary 'women's
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The oppression which arises from aggregating these disparate groups
manifests itself in different and subtle ways. By obscuring those characteris-
tics that cause an individual to identify himself or herself as a member of a
minority group, a message is sent that those essential qualities are irrelevant.
This message is defeating. It is confusing to have one's essence discarded,
particularly when it has been identified as a distinctive characteristic. The
resulting dilemma (minorities are considered different by virtue of possessing
certain characteristics distinct from the majority populations; nevertheless,
those characteristics are treated as irrelevant) has an effect beyond debilitat-
ing and confusing individual members of a minority group. Once the distin-
guishing differences between members of the identified minority groups have
been disregarded as irrelevant and the differences are ignored, the very pur-
pose of the endeavor-to ensure diversity by adding different voices-is lost.
Attention given to, and improvement in, the representation of one particu-
lar minority group, diverts attention from other minority groups that may
not have fared as well."°7 For example, although the FCC has identified
Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, Alaska Natives and Pacific Islanders
as groups that are under-represented in the ownership of broadcast stations,
the degree of under-representation varies among these groups. 108 Improve-
ment in any one group may give the false impression of improvement in all
groups.
Generalizing and grouping people in this fashion is always, even on a su-
perficial level, absurd and easily deconstructed."09 In creating an exception
experience.'" Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581, 586 (1990); see also ADRIENNE RICH, Disloyal to Civilization: Feminism, Racism,
Gynephobia, in ON LIEs, SECRETS AND SILENCE 275, 279-80 (1979) (discussing the racial
separation of feminists).
107. See Grillo & Wildman, supra note 49, at 398 and accompanying text (discussing the
"analogizer problem").
108. Of 8720 responses to an FCC survey sent to 11,000 radio and television stations in the
United States, 86.7% had no minority owners at all anid 96.5% of the stations were owned at
least 50% by non-minorities.
Of the stations with at least one percent minority ownership, 7.6% had black owners; 3.4%
had hispanic owners; 1.2% had asian/pacific owners and 1.2% had american indian or alaska
native owners. As the Multiple Ownership Rules exception only applies where the minority
ownership exceeds 50%, the following statistics are more accurate: 1.9% of all 8720 respond-
ing stations were at least 50% owned by Blacks; one percent were at least 50% owned by
Hispanics; 0.2% were at least 50% owned by Asians or Pacific Islanders and 0.4% were at
least 50% owned by American Indians or Native Alaskans.
The discrepancy between stations with at least one percent black owners and stations with at
least one percent hispanic or asian/pacific or american indian/alaska native owners is dra-
matic. Of the minority groups, Blacks are represented in far greater numbers. CRS REPORT,
supra note 100, at 23-27.
109. On an experiential level, the absurdity of superficial categorizations of people may be
easier for those who are not minorities to understand than for minorities. White Americans
constitute the majority in the United States, and many of them who take their race as a
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to the Multiple Ownership Rules, the FCC sought to include within the
scope of the exception those persons falling within the general categories of
under-represented people. The categories identified by the FCC are broad,
and certain people within each category are bound to bear only a superficial
resemblance to others within that category."' 0 When the categories are fur-
ther collapsed to include all Blacks, Hispanics, Asian/Pacific Islanders and
Native Americans and Native Alaskans, their precision is further eroded.
The less faithful the category is to its original precepts, the more difficult it is
to employ to achieve the goal of diversity." 1 Diversity has some meaning
beyond the addition of any minority voice, regardless of which minority that
voice comes from. That the FCC and Congress recognize that ensuring di-
versity requires attention to each discrete under-represented minority group
is borne out by the list detailing which under-represented minority groups
qualify for the Multiple Ownership Rules exception. However, the derelic-
tion of the FCC and Congress to follow through on that vision of diversity is
manifested in the failure to maintain a distinction among the very groups
"given" do not pause to think about it. Because they consider their race to be the norm, it has
no distinguishing qualities and so, they identify themselves by religion, gender, economic sta-
tus, sexual- or political-preference. When all Whites, male and female, of assorted religions,
economic status, and with various sexual and political preferences, are lumped together on the
basis of race alone, those identifying distinctions remain known to the individual but are ig-
nored by the grouping. To the individual, the race-based categorization may seem absurdly
broad. Many people of color in the United States are constantly made conscious of their race,
and so groupings which are race-based and ignore other characteristics, such as gender, reli-
gion, economic status and/or politics, may seem less absurd to them. This is because many
people of color never lose sight of race as an identifying characteristic. See supra text accom-
panying note 26; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1060, 1066 (1991).
110. There is a substantial and growing body of literature discussing the internal conso-
nance of such categories. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 106, at 588-89 (arguing that race and
gender intersect to distinguish, for example, white feminists from black feminists); Randall L.
Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1802-03 (1989) (de-
nying the existence of a "black point of view" or a "black voice").
With respect to the FCC's ethnic-preference policy, Judge Tamm and then-Judge Scalia of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit questioned whether a
broadcast-station owner with ancestors from Italy "would primarily program Italian operas or
would eschew Wagner in favor of Verdi." Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192, 1198 (D.C. Cir.
1985). This question turns on two presumed truths: (1) that a station owner's heritage will
determine the owner's interests, and (2) that a station owner will indulge his or her own tastes
and ignore the tastes of the members of the relevant programming audience. See id.
111. The easiest and most efficient way to achieve diversity is through an absolute quota
system. However, in the United States, quotas are viewed as being unduly restrictive and as
infringing on cherished values, and have therefore been rejected. Moreover, it has not been
terribly successful in countries where it has been employed. See generally MARC GALANTER,
COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES IN INDIA (1984) (studying
India's use of quotas).
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identified." 2 Failure to recognize and account for this fact may lead to the
addition of one new voice, while the voices of the many remaining under-
represented groups remain unheard.
2. Creating Real Incentives, Preventing False Cures
The structure of encouraging minority ownership through partnerships
invites abuse. "Sham" ownership has many faces, but typically it involves a
partnership where the female or minority partner-in-ownership has no real
connection to the enterprise, other than to help obtain the license. The ap-
plicant who has not been designated as a minority has a strong incentive to
find minority partners to enable it to acquire more stations. "Sham" minor-
ity ownership through such partnerships has not gone unnoted.1 3 Once the
license is granted, however, it is difficult to verify whether the minority or
female owner is actually contributing to the station management."1 4 Despite
112. The FCC, Congress and the courts have made various statements demonstrating that
each of these institutions has forgotten that diversity means more than merely adding minority
voices. For example, in Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992), a majority of the
D.C. Circuit found unconstitutional the FCC's gender-preference for women who will own all
or part of a station in which they will also work. The majority found the nexus between
station ownership by women and any increase in "women's programming" to be insubstantial.
Id. at 398. In his dissent, Chief Judge Mikva pointed out that:
Congress did not emphasize the idea of "women's" or "minority" or any other
"targeted" programming when it endorsed the FCC's gender preference. Congress's
repeated statements on the subject show that it thought increased female ownership
would promote the broader (and less controversial) goal of increasing programming
diversity in general. My colleagues ... focus only on the narrower goal of increasing
women's or minority programming.
Id. at 408 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Judge Mikva found support for the preference in the CRS Report, noting that stations
owned by women are more likely to program not only "women's programming," but also
various categories of "minority programming." Id. at 412-13; see infra part IV.B. (discussing
Lamprecht and the implications of its evidentiary requirements.)
113. See, e.g., Akosua B. Evans, Are Minority Preferences Necessary? Another Look at the
Broadcasting Industry, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 380, 410 (1990) (arguing that sham transac-
tions typically involve situations where the minority owner makes no substantive equity contri-
bution and intends to sell his or her interest once the FCC awards the station; thus, because
there is never any sustained minority ownership, such policy preferences are a sham); Mary
Tabor, Note, Encouraging "those who would speak out with fresh voice" Through the Federal
Communications Commission's Minority Ownership Policies, 76 IOWA L. REV. 609 (1991)
(describing the FCC's evolving views on minority preference and the courts' reactions to FCC
policy); Bending the Rules: Investors Use Blacks as Fronts to Obtain Broadcasting Licenses,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1987, at 1 (reporting that "[w]hites often quickly buy out the minority
partners or write contracts that undermine their clout"); Compassion, Reagan-Style, 193 NEw
REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 1985, at 4 (contesting that minority preference policies have resulted in the
proliferation of black fronts for white broadcasters).
114. An incentive exists for the non-minority owner to share station responsibility with the
minority owner, Both have ownership of the station, and therefore both should carry the
attendant responsibilities. However, FCC records are replete with sales of "controlling inter-
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the problems with sham ownership, the solution is not to do away with mi-
nority preferences. Rather, stringent screening at the application level and
continued monitoring of station management would guard against sham
ownership while serving the goal of diversifying broadcasting.
3. On Honesty and Faithfulness
Underlying the Multiple Ownership Rules are the twin goals "to promote
diversification of ownership in order to maximize diversification of program
and service viewpoints as well as to prevent any undue concentration of eco-
nomic power contrary to the public interest."' 1 5 The FCC's decisions, how-
ever, appear to only realize the latter goal.
When the Multiple Ownership Rules expanded limits on ownership from
seven to twelve stations, Commissioner Fowler, writing for the majority, as-
serted that "it has not before been suggested that the Rule of Sevens does, or
was intended to, play a vital role in the development of minority ownership
or of minority-oriented programming.""' 6 This statement prompted Com-
missioner Rivera to remind the majority of the FCC's historical commit-
ment to the "considerable public value in policies which promote national
ests" to minorities for substantially-below-market prices with the understanding that the mi-
nority partner is not to participate in the station's affairs, or with the understanding that the
minority partner will sell his or her share back to the white majority owner after the FCC
grants the license to the applicants in a comparative hearing. See, e.g., Astroline Communica-
tions Co. v. FCC, 857 F.2d 1556 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (involving a minority owner who purchased
his interest at substantially-below-market price and did not have an opportunity for input into
station's affairs); In re Application For Constr. Permit, Initial Decision, 5 FCC Rcd. 469,
paras. 93-95 (1990) (ruling by A.L.J. Joseph Stirmer) (disallowing integration credit where two
white-male limited-partners solicited an unknown black female to be a general partner holding
25% interest, and where the black female "did nothing but follow the lead of the limited
partners and acquiesced in their decisions in all . . . matters"); In Re Applications of Me-
troplex Communications, Inc. (WHYI-FM), Decision, 4 FCC Rcd. 8149, paras. 51, 54 (1989)
(holding that the limited partnership structure of the applicant was a sham where the general
partner, a female, held only four percent of the equity interest, had never known any of the
limited partners who owned the other 96% interest, and had been recruited by the limited
partners in order to receive integration credit in the comparative hearings), aff'd and modified
by Memorandum Opinion & Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 5610, paras. 23-26 (1990); In Re Applications
of Newton TV Ltd., Decision, 3 FCC Rcd. 553, para. 3, n.2 (1988) (noting without formally
ruling that the applicant presented a "prototypical sham 'limited' partnership applica[tion],"
and that "the foremost victims of such sham applications are the legitimate and bona fide
minority and female applicants"), aff'd and modified by Memorandum Opinion & Order, 4
FCC Rcd. 2561, paras. 7-9 (1988), aff'd and modified by Memorandum Opinion & Order, 5
FCC Rcd. 2755, para. 1 (1990).
115. In re Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules and Regulations
Relating to Multiple Ownership, Report & Order, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953) [hereinafter 1953 Mul-
tiple Ownership Rules].
116. 1984 Multiple Ownership Rules, supra note 92, para. 87, at 46. The "Rule of Sevens"
limited any one owner of broadcast properties to seven each of AM, FM and TV stations. Id.
para. 2, at 18.
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media ownership diversity" ' 17 and that "a small 'new voice' may do more to
further the First Amendment than a loud or large 'old voice.' " '
In a literalist sense, the majority is correct that the Multiple Ownership
Rules were not specifically designed to facilitate minority-group entry into
the broadcast market. However, one of the two stated goals of the Rules is
to diversify voices, which, as interpreted by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, means that the Multiple Owner-
ship Rules work towards diversity through the addition of minority voices to
the airwaves.' 9 The FCC's selective reading of the "original intent" of the
Rules is encompassed within a problem discussed earlier in this Article: the
displacement of the minority group understanding of a term with the major-
ity understanding of that term.' 2 In the present context, the displaced term
is "minority."
When the Multiple Ownership Rules were first promulgated in 1953, the
term "minorities" was not a reference to under-represented racial or ethnic
groups or women. Rather, it referred to those members of the viewing pub-
lic with less-than popular taste. Consider what H. Gifford Irion, an FCC
hearing examiner, had to say about "minority" programming in 1959:
When we think of "the public" we necessarily include minorities
whose needs, interests and tastes may be both reasonable and laud-
able. Obviously there is less temptation for the broadcaster to ex-
pend time and money on providing programs for minority tastes,
but any sound evaluation of the public interest must take them into
account. Thus the Commission itself has emphasized the needfor a
certain amount of free time in order to publicize admittedly worth-
while community organizations and activities. These include well-
known nonprofit groups, such as the Red Cross, and also such causes
as the promotion of traffic safety, fire prevention, registration for vot-
ing, etc. Implicit in all of this is the belief that a broadcaster must
not merely cater to existing tastes and interests but must make at
117. Id. at 71-72 (Rivera, Comm'r, dissenting in part and concurring in part).
118. Id. (quoting Committee for Community Access v. FCC, 737 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir.
1984)).
119. See, e.g., TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986
(1974). In holding that "when minority ownership is likely to increase diversity of content,
especially of opinion and viewpoint, merit should be awarded," the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit referenced the FCC's 1953 Multiple Ownership Rules: "Simply stated, the funda-
mental purpose of this facet of the multiple ownership rules is to promote diversification of
ownership in order to maximize diversification of program and service viewpoints as well as to
prevent any undue concentration of economic power contrary to the public interest." Id. at
938 n.30 (quoting the 1953 Multiple Ownership Rules, supra note 115, para. 10, at 291); ac-
cord In re Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Comm'n Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership, First Report & Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 306, para. 3, at 307 (1970) (stating
that one objective of the Multiple Ownership Rules was to promote diversification).
120. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
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least a modest effort toward improving and widening them. Gilbert
Seldes, a noted critic of radio and television art forms has urged
that the audience must be created; it is not a ready-made compo-
nent of the population but is rather an incipient body of tastes
awaiting to be quickened by the broadcaster's initiative. 21
Irion's perspective at once illustrates the problem discussed in Part II of
this Article and provides the solution. Programs expressing "minority" per-
spectives are defined exclusively in traditional majority terms as program-
ming that enlightens viewers about civic duties. However, Irion recognized
that the broadcaster has both the responsibility and the ability to affect the
majority viewer's taste. Tastes for different programs are created by the
broadcaster who has a "public interest" mandate to broadcast programs that
will infuse the majority culture with minority perspectives.1 22 By creating
"taste" for minority shows, the majority will one day crave "public interest"
programs.
However, the old meaning of the term "minority" does not help the FCC
escape its obligation to diversify viewpoints by including under-represented
racial or ethnic groups or women. The Communications Act of 1934,123 and
the FCC's subsequent guidelines for implementing the Act,124 contemplate
interpretation of the Act's goals to reflect current understandings of its
terms. 125 When the Communications Act was enacted, Congress under-
stood that the substantive contours of the Act were not yet known and left
them to be filled in as the medium developed.' 26 The FCC thawed a 1950s
understanding of how to diversify viewpoints, and used that definition in its
1984 Report and Order regarding Multiple Ownership Rules. In so doing,
the Commission used rhetoric that gave the appearance of working to
achieve that constant goal of the FCC: maximizing the diversification of
viewpoints. However, in using a definition that was frozen in time for nearly
forty years, the FCC was not actually maximizing the diversification of view-
points, as we understand that term today, and thus the FCC was not fulfil-
ling its mandate from Congress.
127
121. H. Gifford Irion, FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competing Applicants, 43 MINN. L.
REV. 479, 480-81 (1959) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)
122. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
123. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1991).
124. See generally Johnson, supra note 79 (discussing FCC guidelines governing new
technologies).
125. See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940) (stating that the
term "public interest ... serves as a supple instrument for the excercise of discretion" by the
FCC); see also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
126. See POTrER, supra note 62; see also text accompanying notes 81-83.
127. This is not to suggest that the 1953 understanding of the terms be ignored. Rather,
the definition should be a current understanding, which includes both the 1953 understanding
as well as a more contemporary meaning of diversification of viewpoints over the air.
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Indeed, after a short section dealing with the impact of the proposed
changes of the Multiple Ownership Rules on minority programming,' 28 the
Commission's Report and Order devoted a significant amount of space to the
diversification of program services.' 29 However, this section of the Report
and Order is almost exclusively devoted to a discussion of how an expansion
of the station ownership limits will improve programming because network
owners have superior local news programs. '3 0 Without stating so explicitly,
it is clear that the FCC is defining programming in the "public interest" as
"public interest programming." Such a definition encompasses program-
ming that is "good for you" in the sense that local community affairs pro-
gramming about road conditions is good for you. 13' The Report and Order
approvingly cites the number of health and economic reporters on staff at
the network news shows to illustrate how programming will improve under
the relaxation of the Multiple Ownership Rules.
132
The concerns that Commissioner Fowler sought to allay by this treatment
of "diversification of program and service viewpoints"' 33 are not the same as
the ones raised in this Article. Nor do they parallel the concerns expressed
by the FCC or the courts in creating and approving the Multiple Ownership
Rules. This is yet another example of the majority and minority communi-
ties having different associations with the same term.' 1 4 For Commissioner
Fowler, and a majority of the FCC Commissioners, diversification of pro-
gram and service viewpoints may be achieved through interlarding Red
Cross Public Service Announcements between episodes of Roseanne and the
local news. 1
35
For a discussion on the increasing disposition of the FCC and the courts to disregard con-
gressional findings, see infra part IV.B.
128. 1984 Multiple Ownership Rules, supra note 92, paras. 87-96.
129. Id., paras. 24-63.
130. Id., paras. 44-59, at 31-37.
131. See infra text accompanying note 135 (defining public interest as being synonymous
with Public Service Announcements for the Red Cross). This Article does not suggest that
"programming in the public interest" should not also include traditional "good-for-you" pub-
lic interest shows about local or community affairs. Rather, it seeks to expand the meaning of
"public interest" programming to include programming that will include minority voices.
132. 1984 Multiple Ownership Rules, supra note 92, para. 49, at 33.
133. 1953 Multiple Ownership Rules, supra note 115.
134. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing different majority and minority
interpretations of the same term).
135. The representation of minority viewpoints in news programming is not addressed spe-
cifically by this Article. Extensive writings have been published about the failure of the televi-
sion news to address minority concerns. See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL
DISORDERS, REPORT 201-14 (1968).
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C. Licensing in the Public Interest
The FCC awards licenses for broadcast television stations to those appli-
cants who best meet a series of criteria designed to provide "the best practi-
cable service to the public" and maximize "diffusion of control of the media
of mass communications." '36 The FCC licensing policy is a two-step pro-
cess. First, the Broadcast Bureau of the FCC selects those applicants who
are at least minimally-qualified from the pool of all applicants.137 If only
one applicant is found to be qualified, then the awarding of a license is an
easy task. However, in most cases, several applicants are qualified and the
second step-designation of applicants for a comparative hearing-is in-
voked. At the comparative hearing, the FCC assigns credits and demerits to
the applicants based on the degree to which they meet the criteria enumer-
ated in the FCC's Policy Statement of Comparative Broadcast Hearings.
138
The applicant with the most credits is awarded the license.'
39
The criteria listed in the FCC's Policy Statement are: diversification of
control of the media of mass communications; full-time participation in sta-
tion operation by owners; proposed program service; past broadcast record;
efficient use of frequency; character and other factors."4 Since 1965, when
the Policy Statement of Comparative Broadcast Hearings was first issued,
Congress, the FCC and the courts have added, deleted and added again race
as a criterion that enhances an applicant's chance of being awarded the li-
cense, 14 1 and although gender is not presently a factor that generates a pref-
136. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Public Notice, I F.C.C.2d 393,
394 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Policy Statement].
137. Applicants must meet legal, financial, technical and moral statutory requirements.
These requirements include: U.S. citizenship of both the applicant and its shareholders; neces-
sary financial resources to run the station; appropriate technical equipment; and an absence of
immoral behavior. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 308(b), 310(b) (1988). In addi-
tion, applications are screened by the FCC for "public interest" criteria, such as proposed
program services, and concentration of control of mass media. See id. § 309(a); see also Rob-
ert A. Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Pro-
ceedings, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1, 17-24 (1971) (discussing public-interest issues involved in FCC
licensing procedures).
138. See 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 136, at 393.
139. The number of applicants in the Comparative Hearing pool generally ranges from
three to six. Matthew L. Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Application of Public
Choice Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717, 745-46 n.163 (1979).
140. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 136, at 393 passim.
141. See discussion infra part IV. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit added race
and ethnicity to the list of factors which might enhance an applicant's chances to get a license
after the FCC held such factors were impermissible considerations. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495
F.2d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974). Following the TV9 decision,
two subsequent cases held that the Communications Act's public interest mandate effectively
requires enhancement of minority applicants. See West Mich. Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735
F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985); Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056
(D.C. Cir. 1975). The FCC responded to these decisions by adopting a distress-sale policy,
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erence for applicants, it has been at various times over the past fifteen
years. 142 Despite the different fates suffered by the race- and gender-based
preferences, they were born of the same notion: diversity.
IV. DETERMINING THE PUBLIC INTEREST: WHO DECIDES?
Over the years, Congress, the FCC and the courts have devised a number
of ways to diversify voices in broadcasting. Some schemes give explicit pref-
erences to minorities and women, while others are designed to force station
owners to be more responsive to minority concerns in the licensed communi-
ties. All of the plans, however, recognize the importance of diversity to the
public at large and are consistent with the FCC's charge to license broadcast
stations in the public interest. This section discusses the roles of Congress,
the FCC and the courts in creating and upholding those schemes.
Initially, the FCC accorded no preference to minorities or women in the
absence of a demonstrated nexus between station ownership and program
awarding tax certificates and giving preferences to minorities in the comparative-licensing pro-
cess. See In re Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, Policy Statement, 68 F.C.C.2d
979, 982-83 (1978). The FCC had begun to reexamine these policies, with an eye towards
disbanding them when Congress halted this effort. See In re Reexamination of the Commis-
sion's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial,
Ethnic or Gender Classifications, Notice of Inquiry, 1 FCC Rcd. 1315 (1986) [hereinafter Re-
examination of Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications], modified by order, 2 FCC Rcd. 2377
(1987). Congressional action took the form of a rider to the Continuing Appropriations Act
for the Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-31 (1987). Identical riders
have been attached to the budget in 1988, 1989 and 1990. See Pub. L. No. 101-515, 104 Stat.
2101, 2136-37 (1990); Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 988, 1020-21 (1989); Pub. L. No. 100-
459, 102 Stat. 2186, 2216-17 (1988). Notwithstanding the congressional action, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found the distress-sale policy unconstitutional. See Shurberg
Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom., Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); infra part IV.A.
142. The FCC first awarded the gender-based preference to women in In Re Applications
for Const. Permits (Gainsville, Fla.), Memorandum Opinion & Order, 70 F.C.C.2d 143, para.
11, at 149 (1978) (ruling by Review Board). The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck
the policy down in Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The D.C. Circuit re-heard
the case en banc and vacated the prior decision. Steele v. FCC, 806 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(en banc). The FCC then began to re-examine its race- and gender-based preferences, believing
them to be unconstitutional and contrary to the Communications Act of 1934. See Reexami-
nation of Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, supra note 141. Congress then directed the
FCC to reinstate the race- and gender-based preferences. Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329,
1329-31 (1987); see also supra note 141 (discussing Congress' continued efforts through such
riders).
The final chapter in the history of gender-based preferences was handed down in June 1992.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found unconstitutional the FCC's award of en-
hancement credits to women. Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The major-
ity opinion, authored by then-Judge Thomas, was sharply criticized by Chief Judge Mikva.
See id, at 404-15 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
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diversity.' 43 The FCC believed that the link between the race of the licensee
and program diversity could be forged only by a demonstration of the mi-
nority owner's planned participation in station affairs. 1"
In TV 9, Inc. v. FCC,145 an activist United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit found that a demonstrated nexus was not
necessary in the face of a "[r]easonable expectation" that the minority
station ownership would enhance the program diversity.146 Since the TV 9
decision, the reasonableness of that expectation has been the central point
around which debate and litigation has revolved. The United States
Supreme Court settled some of that controversy in Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC,'4 7 which found that the FCC's policies of awarding enhancement
credits for minorities in comparative broadcasting proceedings for new
licenses and in minority "distress sale" situations did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
148
143. "[The] Communications Act, like the Constitution, is color blind. What the Commu-
nications Act demands is service to the public in the programming of the station and that
factor alone must control the licensing processes, not the race, color or creed of an applicant."
In Re Applications for Constr. Permit of Mid-Florida TV Corp. (Orlando, Fla.), Initial Deci-
sion, 33 F.C.C.2d 34, para. 872 (1970) (ruling by Hearing Examiner Herbert Sharfman) (quot-
ing from Mid-Florida TV Corp.'s proposed conclusions, para. 64) [hereinafter Initial
Decision], aff'd and modified by Decision, 33 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 29 (1972), rev'd sub nom. TV
9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
144. In its initial decision, the FCC found that:
[Unless Comint showed that the participation of Mr. Perkins and Dr. Smith [both
black American stockholders in Mid-Florida TV Corp.] in the operation of the sta-
tion would use their experience, background, and knowledge of the community in a
way likely to result in a superior service it cannot prevail on this point. There is
nothing in the degree or type of participation proposed by Mr. Perkins and Dr. Smith
which gives assurance that the benefits of their racial background would inure in any
material degree to the operation of the station .... [I]t cannot be held, under the
Policy Statement, which demands the practical application of attributes through sta-
tion participation, that their part ownership in Comint implies the rendition of a
service for a minority group which other applicants could not provide.
Initial Decision, supra, para. 872.
145. 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
146. TV9, 495 F.2d at 938; see also Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(describing TV9 as standing for the proposition that black ownership and participation will
bring about program diversity).
147. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. The majority opinion, written by Justice Bren-
nan, was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justices Brennan and
Marshall are no longer on the Court, rendering Metro Broadcasting's future uncertain. The
seats occupied by Justices Brennan and Marshall have been filled by Justices Souter and
Thomas. While Justice Souter's position is difficult to predict with certainty, Justice Thomas'
opinion in Lamprecht v. FCC, see infra text accompanying notes 149-51 (discussing the Lam-
precht case), gives a rather clear indication that he would overturn the Metro Broadcasting
decision. Although Justice Thomas faced questioning about the Metro Broadcasting decision
during his confirmation hearings, and various reports confirm that he had already authored the
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The debate has been reopened and enlarged by the D.C. Circuit's decision
in Lamprecht v. FCC.'4 9 In Lamprecht, then-Judge Thomas, writing for the
majority, found unconstitutional a similar FCC policy preference for wo-
men.15° The majority's rationale was that no nexus between female owner-
ship and "women's programming" was demonstrated. 1' This section
explores the data which Congress gathered to make its laws, as well as the
requirement of proof of the nexus between station ownership and
programming.
Lamprecht majority opinion, which distinctly disapproves of Metro Broadcasting, he never
actually responded to the questions Senator Specter (R-Pa.) put to him:
Sen. Arlen Specter: Judge Thomas, there were two major cases decided relatively
recently on the equal-protection clause-Metro v. Federal Communications Com-
mission, which was congressional action, and Richmond v. Croson, which was a city
council action-and my question to you is, in applying the equal-protection clause,
does it make any difference whether the legislative enactment comes from the Con-
gress, as opposed to a city council?
Judge Clarence Thomas: Senator, I think that Metro Broadcasting, of course, used
the equal-protection analysis, but it was a Fifth Amendment case. The Court has
made a distinction in Croson, as well as in Metro, that when the race- or gender-
based policy (I think race-based policy in these cases) was as a result of Congress'
effort, the level of scrutiny is lower than it is if it is on a policy that is developed by a
state or local government.
Specter: Well, the Fifth Amendment due-process clause, of course, picks up the
equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment...
Thomas: That's right.
Specter: ... so the analysis would be the same as the equal protection.
Thomas: That's right.
Specter: So you would accord greater strength or latitude to a congressional enact-
ment, as opposed to a city council enactment?
Thomas: That's right, that is under existing case law, that's the approach.
Specter: Let me cut through quite a lot of discussion with, again, a very direct ques-
tion. Without getting into the undergirdings of the opinion in Metro Broadcasting,
would you agree with this succinct statement from Justice [John Paul] Stevens' con-
curring opinion, at the very start, in Metro: "Today, the Court squarely rejects the
proposition that a government decision that rests on a racial classification is never
permissible, except as a remedy for a past wrong."
Thomas: That's the state of the law.
Specter: You agree with that state of the law?
Thomas: I have no reason to disagree with it.
Specter Questioned Thomas About Metro, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 30, 1991, at 20 (quoting from
the Sept. 16, 1991 Thomas confirmation hearings).
149. 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Lamprecht was cited in a recent D.C. Circuit opinion
for the proposition that empirical support is required to prove that "the means chosen are
'substantially related' to achieving 'important' governmental objectives." Federal Election
Comm'n v. International Funding Inst., Inc., 969 F.2d 1110, 1120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ran-
dolph, J., concurring), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 605 (1992).
150. 958 F.2d at 382.
151. Id.
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A. Metro Broadcasting v. FCC
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 152 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of two FCC policies designed to increase minority broad-
cast-station ownership: the minority "distress sale" program153 and the
awarding of tax incentive certificates 54 to minorities in comparative broad-
cast license proceedings. 55 The Court imposed and found the requirement
of a nexus between ownership of broadcast stations by minorities and the
programming broadcast over those stations.
1. Congressional Factfinding
The Metro Broadcasting Court stated that the fact that the FCC policies
at issue had been "specifically approved-indeed, mandated-by Congress"
was "of overriding significance." 15 6 Congress, as opposed to the Judiciary,
has as "its broader mission [the duty] to investigate and consider all facts
and opinions that may be relevant to the resolution of an issue."'
' 57
The FCC's 1978 Policy Statement 158 announcing these two policies-
minority distress sales and minority enhancement credits in comparative li-
cense proceedings-was issued after some fifteen years of studies conducted
152. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
153. See In re Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, Policy Statement, 68 F.C.C.2d
979, 983 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Policy Statement]. The "distress sale" policy allows a broad-
caster whose license has been designated for a revocation hearing, or whose renewal applica-
tion has been designated for a hearing, to assign the license to an FCC-approved minority
enterprise. The sale price must not exceed seventy-five percent of the fair market value. Be-
cause of the low sale price, purchase is attractive to minority enterprises. The policy is also
attractive to the seller: Broadcast station licenses are rarely designated for revocation hearings
in the absence of a serious violation of an FCC policy. If a station goes to the hearing and
loses, it has no license to sell. Thus, the opportunity to sell, even at the discounted price, is
attractive. See generally Philip H. Lebowitz, Comment, FCC Minority Distress Sale Policy:
Public Interest v. The Public's Interest, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 365 (1981) (discussing the FCC's
minority distress-sale policy).
154. See 1978 Policy Statement, supra note 153, at 983. The FCC Policy Statement on
Minority Ownership announced that "minority ownership and participation in management
would be considered in a comparative hearing as a 'plus' to be weighed together with all other
relevant factors. The 'plus' is awarded only to the extent that a minority owner actively partic-
ipates in the day-to-day management of the station." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 557.
155. For a review of the long history of congressional action and studies of minorities in
broadcasting that preceded the enactment of the FCC's Statement of Policy on Minority Own-
ership of Broadcasting Facilities, see Brief of the United States Senate As Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 5-20, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No.
89-543).
156. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563.
157. Id. at 572. The "expertise that Congress acquires in the consideration and enactment
of earlier legislation" is to be accorded deference in its conclusions with respect to the empiri-
cal data which establish the nexus.
158. 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978).
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by Congress and various interest groups. 159 From 1978 through 1986, Con-
gress debated, but failed to pass, several proposals designed to enhance
minority ownership."6 In 1986, the FCC began to reconsider the constitu-
159. See generally NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT (1968)
(finding that an essentially "all-white" media had failed to communicate to white audiences an
understanding of black culture, thought and history; finding further that the media had failed
to communicate to black audiences since it portrayed blacks from a white perspective; and
noting that increasing the number of minorities employed in the industry could correct the
situation); see also Broadcast License Renewal: Hearings on H.R. 5546 Before the Subcomm. on
Communications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pts. l&2 (1973); Broadcast License Renewal Act. Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pts. l&2
(1974).
In 1973 and 1974, committees in the House and in the Senate held extensive hearings on
proposals to extend the broadcast license period from three to five years and to modify the
comparative-hearing process. During the course of those hearings, organizations representing
the interests of minorities testified that policies that reduced opportunities for individuals to
challenge existing licensees would perpetuate the status quo which excluded minorities.
UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WINDOW DRESSING ON THE SET: WOMEN AND
MINORITIES IN TELEVISION (1977) (reporting to the President and Congress regarding the
inadequate portrayal of women and minorities in television).
Studies exploring the subject of women and minorities in television have continued un-
abated. See, e.g., UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WINDOW DRESSING ON THE
SET: AN UPDATE (1979) (updating the President and Congress on the continuing inadequate
portrayal of women and minorities in television; FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N MI-
NORITY OWNERSHIP TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MINORITY OWNERSHIP IN BROADCASTING
(1978) (reporting that minority ownership policies were justified to increase diversity in view-
points and to remedy effects of past discrimination), see also CRS REPORT, supra note 100
(analyzing data the FCC collected during its preference-policy inquiry). The report "clearly
demonstrates that minority ownership of broadcast stations does increase the diversity of view-
points presented over the airwaves." 134 CONG. REC. S10021 (daily ed. July 27, 1988) (state-
ment of Sen. Hollings).
160. In 1978, Congress considered a major proposal to deregulate the broadcasting indus-
try. The Communications Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 13015 Before the Subcomm. on Com-
munications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978). The proposed Communications Act of 1978 would have, inter alia, replaced compara-
tive hearings with a lottery; and created a fund for loans to minorities who sought to buy
stations. Such legislation was not enacted that year.
Nonetheless, in 1979, the House proposed the Communications Act of 1979, which would
have provided that any minority applicant for a license not previously assigned would be
counted twice in the pool from which lottery winners were chosen. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM.
ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1979: SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALY-
SIS 39-41 (Comm. Print 1979).
In 1981, Congress finally authorized a lottery system for initial licenses or construction per-
mits as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
357, 736-37 (1981). However, the FCC did not implement the statute. In re Amendment of
Part 1 of the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection from Among Mutually Exclusive
Competing Applications Using Random Selection or Lotteries Instead of Comparative Hear-
ings, Report & Order, 89 F.C.C.2d 257, para. 1,.at 257-58 (1982). In response, Congress en-
acted a second lottery statute, The Communications Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, sec. 115,
96 Sat. 1087, 1094 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1988)). Finally, in 1983 the FCC adopted
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tionality of its policies giving preferences to minorities and women.' 6 ' Pend-
ing an outcome of its reconsideration, the FCC suspended those policies. 
162
In 1987, Congress conducted hearings on appropriations to the FCC, includ-
ing its allocation of funds to study the suspended policies.163 While the FCC
continued to study its policies, Congress enacted, and the President signed
into law, the Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988.164 The
Act appropriated money to the FCC on the condition that none of the funds
would be used to examine or alter current FCC policies regarding minority
and female ownership of broadcasting licenses.
165
rules to govern the use of a lottery. See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Allow
the Selection from Among Certain Competing Applications Using Random Selection or Lot-
teries Instead of Comparative Hearings, Second Report & Order, 93 F.C.C.2d 952, para. 61, at
974 (1983).
In 1983, the Senate passed a comprehensive broadcast deregulation bill which would have
eliminated comparative procedures for license renewals. S. 55, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
The legislation was not enacted. See 40 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, ALMANAC: 98TH
CONGRESS, 2D SESSION.... 1984, 286 (1985).
161. The Commission's actions grew out of a D.C. Circuit case, Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d
1192 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 806 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (en banc), which challenged the
constitutionality of the FCC's preference for female applicants. In Steele, the court held that
although preference policies were valid with respect to minorities, the FCC lacked the author-
ity to grant like credit to females. See id. at 1192. The opinion was vacated by the D.C.
Circuit en banc and scheduled for rehearing. 806 F.2d at 1126. Before the rehearing, the FCC
requested that the case be remanded to the FCC so that it might reconsider its policies. The
FCC then began to reconsider its distress-sale policy as well as its policy giving enhancement
tax credits for minority ownership in the comparative-license proceedings.
162. See Reexamination of Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, supra note 141.
In response to the FCC's suspension of its policies, a number of bills proposing the codifica-
tion of the minority-ownership policy were introduced in Congress. See S. 1277, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987); S. 1095, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1090, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); H.R. 293, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Nevertheless, no permanent codification of
the policy took place.
163. Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appro-
priations for Fiscal Year 1988: Hearings on H.R. 2763 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1987) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (ques-
tioning the FCC's dissatisfaction with its policy when Congress and courts had approved it).
A number of bills were proposed in Congress to codify the suspended FCC policies. See supra
note 162 (citing proposed legislation).
164. Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat.
1329-31 (1987).
165. Specifically, the Act provided:
That none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to repeal, to retroac-
tively apply changes in, or to continue a reexamination of, the policies of the Federal
Communications Commission with respect to comparative licensing, distress sales
and tax certificates granted under 26 U.S.C. 1071, to expand minority and women
ownership of broadcasting licenses, including those established in Statement of Pol-
icy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities and Mid-Florida Television Corp.
which were effective prior to September 12, 1986, other than to close [Steele v. FCC]
with a reinstatement of prior policy and a lifting of suspension of any sales, licenses,
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The Appropriations Acts for fiscal years 1989 and 1990 included similar
provisions.1 66 The Report of the Senate Committee on Appropriations ra-
tionalized that "promoting diversity of ownership of broadcast properties
satisfies important public policy goals" and that "[d]iversity of ownership
results in diversity of programming and improved service to minority and
women audiences."
167
Although the 1988 Appropriations Act's restrictions effectively precluded
the FCC from persisting in the study of its policies and the status of minori-
ties in broadcasting,1 68 Congress continued its investigation of the matter. 
69
In June 1988, the Congressional Research Service concluded its study,
Minority Broadcast Station Ownership and Broadcast Programming: Is There
a Nexus?, and found that a nexus did exist.
170
In sum, Congress studied the issue thoroughly. And it found that minori-
ties and women were under-represented in broadcasting as station owners
and employees, and as a result, were under-served as viewers. Further,
applications, or proceedings, which were suspended pending the conclusion of the
inquiry.
Id.
166. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-459, 102 Stat. 2216 (1990); Departments of
Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 1020 (1991).
167. S. REP. No. 182, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1987). The Committee Report also re-
ferred to an earlier conference report on the granting of broadcast licenses through lotteries
that studied the treatment of minorities and women in broadcasting. Id. at 77; see also 133
CONG. REC. S 14395 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1987) (comments of Sen. Lautenberg) ("As recently as
10 years ago, there were fewer than 60 minority-owned broadcast licenses. Now, there are
250. The FCC has not only cast doubt on future progress in this area, it has beclouded the
status of current license applicants.").
168. In 1988, the FCC ended its inquiry. See In Re Reexamination of the Commission's
Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales, and Tax Certificate Policies Premised Upon Racial,
Ethnic or Gender Classifications, Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 766, paras. 4, 7 (1988) (proceeding
terminated).
169. See, e.g., Minority Ownership of Broadcast Stations.- Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1989).
170. CRS REPORT, supra note 100, at 2. The study concludes that:
The analysis showed that while the share of all stations in which members of minor-
ity groups hold an ownership interest is relatively small, the groups of stations that
do have minority owners have a greater proportion of their stations programming for
their own minority audience, and to a lesser extent, to their targeted audiences than
do stations with no minority owners .... [B]ased on these findings, there is a strong
indication that minority and women station ownership results in a greater degree of
minority programming.
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Congress found that the underrepresentation of women and minorities af-
fected the entire viewing audience, not just minorities and women.171
2. Standard of Review
Programs involving race- or gender-based classifications implicate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 172 Accordingly,
courts examine such programs with heightened scrutiny. 173 In Metro Broad-
casting, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, pieced together the frac-
tured opinions in Fullilove v. Klutznick,174 and announced a new test for
171. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1982) ("[T]he American
public will benefit by having access to a wider diversity of information sources."); see also
Minority Ownership of Broadcast Stations: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Communications of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1989)
(testimony of Roderick K. Porter, Deputy Chief, Mass Media Bureau of the FCC) ("[T]he
FCC's minority policies are based on our conclusion that the entire broadcast audience, re-
gardless of its racial composition will benefit .... ").
172. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 ("[N]or shall any State... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause applies to the federal government, as well as the states, through the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
173. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment essentially directs that all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
There are three standards that courts use in determining the validity of certain classifications
used in federal or state legislation, or other official action, under the Equal Protection Clause.
The traditional, and most commonly used standard is the "rational basis" test. Rational
basis scrutiny:
permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some
groups differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's
objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional
power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statu-
tory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify it.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
The next level of scrutiny is known as the "intermediate" test. It has typically been applied
to gender-based classifications, but was adopted in Metro Broadcasting for benign racial-classi-
fications as well. See infra text accompanying notes 174-77. Under intermediate scrutiny, a
classification "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
The final point on the continuum of review is "strict scrutiny," which is typically applied
when the government classifies by race, alienage or national origin. See Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886).
These factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state inter-
est that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy .... For these reasons ... these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and
will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). As the test name
implies, legislation rarely survives "strict scrutiny."
174. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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congressionally-mandated "benign race-conscious measures."' 75  These
race-conscious measures "are constitutionally permissible to the extent that
they serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress
and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives."'1
76
The Metro Broadcasting majority found the fostering of programming di-
versity to be an "important governmental objective."' 77 Although Justice
O'Connor disagreed with that finding,' 7  her dissenting opinion centered
around the level of scrutiny used. Justice O'Connor urged that the appropri-
ate standard of review is "compelling interest," a standard that has never
been met by any program seeking to remedy past discrimination. 179 Justice
O'Connor proposed that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review
of any race-based classification:' "The interest in increasing the diversity
of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest. It is simply too
amorphous, too insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for
employing racial classifications."''
3. The Requirement of Traditionally-Acceptable Proof
Despite all of the congressional studies and fact-finding, the Court in
Metro Broadcasting was careful to recognize the fragility of the link between
ownership of stations and programming broadcast over those stations. The
majority in Metro Broadcasting rode a fine line between the impermissible
stereotyping of minorities and the permissible making of a broad prediction
about the behavior of minorities. The Court wrote that:
Congress and the FCC maintain simply that expanded minority
ownership of broadcast outlets will, in the aggregate, result in
greater broadcast diversity.... The predictive judgment about the
overall result of minority entry into broadcasting is not a rigid as-
sumption about how minority owners will behave in every case but
rather is akin to Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke that greater
175. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563 (1990). In defining "benign race-
conscious measures," the Court added that such measures are constitutionally permissible,
"even if those measures are not 'remedial' in the sense of being designed to compensate victims
of past governmental or societal discrimination." Id. at 564-65.
176. Id. at 565.
177. Id. at 567. The programming diversity derives from the FCC's charter to license in
"the public interest." See supra part II.
178. Justice O'Connor challenged the majority decision, stating that "[t]he remedial inter-
est may support race classifications because that interest is necessarily related to past discrimi-
nation; yet the interest in diversity of viewpoints provides no legitimate, much less important,
reason to employ race classifications apart from generalizations impermissibly equating race
with thoughts and behavior." Id. at 615 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 612.
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admission of minorities would contribute, on average, "to the 'ro-
bust exchange of ideas.' "182
Characterizing its judgment as "predictive" is a safe way for the Court to
say that it is approving Congress' social experiment. The dissent in Metro
Broadcasting, however, appeared to interpret the majority opinion's uphold-
ing the preference as a finding (which they don't see) of a single voice ema-
nating from stereotypes. Both Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro
Broadcasting, and the majority opinion in Lamprecht, a3 indicate that cer-
tain members of the Supreme Court are not inclined to allow Congress to
engage in "social experiments." In her dissent, Justice O'Connor admon-
ishes that:
Social scientists may debate how peoples' thoughts and behavior
reflect their background, but the Constitution provides that the
Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among individ-
uals based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how
they act or think .... The Court's application of a lessened equal
protection standard to congressional actions finds no support in
our cases or in the Constitution. 14
Upholding a "social experiment" planned by Congress is neither as dan-
gerous, nor as sinister, as the dissent makes it appear. This is largely true
because the scope of the term "experiment" and the operation of Congress
are inherently opposite. The nature of the legislative branch's cumbersome
and deliberative processes serves as a check against feared social experi-
ments.185  The size of Congress also serves as a check against its being cap-
tured by interest groups.'1 6 The very inefficiency of a national legislature
182. Id. at 579 (quoting University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978)).
183. Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see infra part IV.B.
184. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 602-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
185. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (holding that the presentment
clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, and the bicamerality requirement, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1,
cl. 7, serve as structural restraints on the "hydraulic pressure inherent within [the legislature]
to exceed the outer limits of its power"). See generally MIKVA & LANE, supra note 75.
186. As Justice Scalia has noted:
[The] distinction between federal and state (or local) action based on race rests not
only upon the substance of the Civil War Amendments, but upon social reality and
governmental theory.... To the children of the Founding Fathers, this should come
as no surprise. An acute awareness of the heightened danger of oppression from
political factions in small, rather than large, political units dates to the very begin-
ning of our national history. As James Madison observed in support of the proposed
Constitution's enhancement of national powers:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and inter-
ests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more fre-
quently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number
of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which
they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plan of op-
pression. Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and
1992]
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and its processes serve as checks against factions being able to advance or
enact new or experimental legislation." 7 The selection of a standard of scru-
tiny must be made in the context of an understanding of Congress' structural
limitations.
B. Deference to Congressional Factfinding: Lamprecht v. FCC
A similar appreciation of the paucity of structural limitations on the judi-
ciary is needed, for that is the branch that applies the relevant standard of
scrutiny to the policies at issue. This section leaves behind the question of
what standard of review governs and considers judicial deference to congres-
sional findings of fact, specifically in Lamprecht v. FCC. 8' In Lamprecht v.
FCC, 189 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit did not hold preferences for women in the ownership and licensing of
broadcast stations unconstitutional. Rather, it found that-absent a show-
ing of a nexus between the preference granted to women broadcast-owners
who will actively participate in the station, and the programming on that
station-such a preference violates the Equal Protection Clause.' 90
The standard of review announced in Metro Broadcasting also applies to
the FCC's preference for women.'91 Because Metro Broadcasting held that
the diversification of viewpoints over the airwaves is an important govern-
mental objective, 192 the only issue open for the Lamprecht court to decide
was whether the FCC's policy, which grants preferences to women, was
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common
motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own
strength and to act in unison with each other.
City of Richmond v, J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 522-23 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citations omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, 82-84 (James Madison)).
187. See generally MIKVA & LANE, supra note 75.
188. 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 398.
191. The policies must be substantially related to an important governmental objective in
order to survive scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 391.
Then-Judge Thomas, writing for the majority, explained that scrutiny of gender-based clas-
sifications, whether benign or not, is conducted at the intermediate level of review. See, e.g.,
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (holding that gender-based
classifications must serve "important governmental objectives" and be "substantially related"
to the achievement of those objectives. Arguably, based upon Metro Broadcasting, scrutiny of
benign gender-based classifications should be ratcheted down a notch and conducted under a
rational basis standard. However, then-Judge Thomas' majority opinion dismisses this argu-
ment without explanation. "We see no reason after Metro Broadcasting to examine sex-con-
scious measures mandated by Congress any more or less strictly than before, and no one
seriously contends that we should." Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 391.
192. Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 391.
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"substantially related" to that legitimate and important governmental
objective.
1 93
In making a legislative determination in favor of such a preference, Con-
gress and the FCC relied on studies showing that broadcast stations owned
by women aired more women's and minority programming than stations
owned by men. 194 Although other studies were conducted,19 the Lam-
precht majority relied exclusively on the Congressional Research Service
study, Minority Broadcast Station Ownership and Broadcast Programming: Is
There a Nexus?.' 96 The study indicates that the nexus exists with respect to
women as well as minorities. Specifically, the study found:
The analysis showed that while the share of all stations in which
members of minority groups hold an ownership interest is rela-
tively small, the groups of stations that do have minority owners
have a greater proportion of their stations programming for their
own minority audience, and to a lesser extent, to their targeted
audiences than do stations with no minority owners. Stations with
women owners follow the same general pattern. However, their
share of the total industry is greater than it is for minority owners,
and they do not program to their own audience (women) as much as
minority-owned stations program to theirs ... [Biased on these
findings, there is a strong indication that minority and women
station ownership results in a greater degree of minority
programming. 1
97
Despite the study's explicit statement, then-Judge Thomas concluded that
the study "does answer its own question, at least with respect to women.
The answer it gives is 'no.' "198
The Lamprecht majority's refusal to defer to Congress' findings of fact is
of interest for two reasons. The first reason relates to the majority's broad
misstatement of the findings of fact before it, even in the face of a Supreme
Court opinion holding otherwise on strikingly similar facts. In itself, this is
a troubling, but fairly pedestrian occurrence. Then-Judge Thomas is not the
first judge to gloss over legislative fact-finding. In Lochner v. New York,' 99
Justice Harlan expressed concern over the willingness of some of his col-
leagues to discard the findings of the New York State legislature, stating
"[W]e [cannot] assume that [the] legislature acted without due deliberation,
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., CRS REPORT, supra note 100, at 44.
195. See Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 414-15 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) (listing other data gath-
ered on the effect of women as broadcast-station owners).
196. Id. at 394-95.
197. CRS REPORT, supra note 100, at 2.
198. Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 396.
199. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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or that it did not determine this question upon the fullest attainable informa-
tion, and for the common good."'
Then-Judge Thomas' rejection of the congressional findings as insignifi-
cant is disturbing. More troubling, however, is the message the majority
opinion is sending to Congress: there is no way to prove the the existence of
the nexus. Then-Judge Thomas bemoaned the lack of "data" demonstrating
the nexus. Then, forced to confront the data, he stated that:
[t]he data in Minority Programming fail to establish any statisti-
cally meaningful link between ownership by women and program-
ming of any particular kind. The study, in short, highlights the
hazards associated with government endeavors like this one. As
Justice Brennan has written for the Court, "proving broad socio-
logical proposition by statistics is a dubious business, and one that
inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that under-
lies the Equal Protection Clause."' '
In essence, then-Judge Thomas' opinion reveals that while he will accept
statistical data as evidence of the nexus between female ownership and pro-
gramming, he will not accept statistical data as evidence of a broad sociolog-
ical proposition. Of course, as both then-Judge Thomas and Justice Brennan
recognize, it is difficult to quantify certain issues statistically. However, that
does not mean these statistically unquantifiable problems and solutions do
not exist. Nor does it mean they do not exist in a very real and meaningful
way. For it is the unquantifiable, somewhat unarticulable interests that
make up the public good, and that is Congress' domain. The judiciary is
best suited to determine the more concrete and describable violation of indi-
vidual rights.
Lamprecht accomplished what Lochner did not, and it did so in the con-
text of fact-finding by Congress, not a state legislature.2 °2 A new standard
was announced in Lamprecht, and it is that Congress must empirically es-
tablish the link connecting its legislation with the problem sought to be
cured by the legislation.20 a In the Lamprecht case, the nexus between the
200. Id. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
201. Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 398 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976)).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86 (discussing the greater deference accorded
Congress as opposed to a state legislature).
203. Indeed, Lamprecht has already been cited for this proposition. See Federal Election
Comm'n v. International Funding Inst., 969 F.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
The government must prove that the means chosen are "substantially related" to
achieving "important" governmental objectives. Without empirical support, the pro-
vision will not survive. That is the point of now-Justice Thomas' opinion for this
court in Lamprecht v. FCC ....
The majority's opinion does not convince me that the proviso limiting 2 U.S.C.
§ 438(a)(4) could survive such stringent analysis. A last-minute floor amendment
passed with limited discussion, the proviso was not supported by any legislative fac-
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problem that Congress identified, and ordered the FCC to address, is not one
that is demonstrable by any amount or any kind of data.2"
Requiring that proof of a nexus between ownership of a station by a mi-
nority and programming on that station be made empirically is absurd. The
very identification of the problem-minority voices are not heard by the ma-
jority culture-is too subtle to fit into traditional doctrine. So much silence
has passed through so many generations, and that silence has defined the
way the majority culture perceives, identifies and solves problems plaguing
the public interest. That a nexus between minority station ownership and
minority programming is demonstrated or not is meaningless without a
sense of what minority voices sound like.
In the absence of a parallel universe in which minority voices have been
consistently listened to, it is impossible to present absolute evidence showing
a nexus between minority ownership and program content. Society does not
yet know what minority programming might look like without the influence
of decades of majority culture. Any "proof" of such a nexus put forth today
may or may not be the product of false consciousness. 20 Although some
preliminary conclusions about the existence of such a nexus may be drawn
from the years of studies conducted, they are of no legal value unless the
legal system is altered to accommodate them.
This section has traced the arguments presented by the majorities and the
dissents in the two seminal judicial opinions in this area: Metro Broadcasting
v. FCC and Lamprecht v. FCC. These decisions fail to accord serious con-
sideration to the public-interest touchstone under which the licensing of
broadcast stations is statutorily mandated. Rather, these cases focus on
whether the award of a broadcast station license to a minority or a woman
unconstitutionally infringes on the rights of the non-minority or man who
has not received the license. This error stems from viewing racial discrimi-
tual findings. The Federal Election Commission has not filled the void in its presen-
tation to us. The record contains no factual support for my colleagues' assumption
that the proviso will increase the overall level of speech.
Id. at 1120-21 (Randolph, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
204. That empirical data is difficult, if not impossible, to marshall meaningfully in the First
Amendment context has been recognized.
It appears, however, that a restriction on first amendment activity occasioning inter-
mediate scrutiny need not be supported by [legislative factual] finding[s]: In Seattle
Times the Court upheld a restriction on free expression subject to intermediate scru-
tiny without demanding empirical support for the premise that underlay the restric-
tion. Perhaps the Court does not require such support for the very reason that,
as Judge Randolph states, "[tihe accuracy of legislative judgments giving rise to free
speech claims is not, as a general matter, readily susceptible to empirical
demonstration."
Id. at 1117 n.* (citations omitted).
205. See FOUCAUT, supra note 101.
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nation as a contractual problem, involving only the named parties to the
matter, rather than as a problem affecting all of society.2 °6 The arguments
put forth by the dissent and majority in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC and
Lamprecht v. FCC, respectively, are misguided in requiring that something
that cannot be shown in traditional terms be shown in traditional terms.
Underlying Metro Broadcasting and Lamprecht, is a battle over which
branch, the judiciary or Congress, is the appropriate body to determine what
is in the public interest. This is an old debate, long resolved in favor of
Congress.2 ° 7 However, the Lamprecht majority and the Metro Broadcasting
dissent give it new relevance by constructively rejecting Congress as the ap-
propriate body to determine the public interest and expressly rejecting Con-
gress as the appropriate body to ascertain how to determine the public
interest.2 °8
V. CONCLUSION
The showing of a nexus through terms traditionally employed by the
Supreme Court is presently impossible. The poet, Adrienne Rich, has de-
scribed the problem well:
this is the oppressor's language
206. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 122-128 (Terence Irwin, trans., 1985). Aris-
totle distinguished between distributive justice, required "in the distribution of honours or
wealth or anything else that can be divided among members of a community who share in a
political system; for here it is possible for one member to have a share equal or unequal to
another's," id. at 122, and rectificatory justice, encompassing inequality arising out of con-
tracts, torts and criminal behavior. Id. at 122, 125-28. Metro Broadcasting and Lamprecht,
like most reverse discrimination cases, essentially arose over a disagreement over the charac-
terization of the justice to be effected. See also Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARv. L. REV. 525, 527-28 (1990).
207. See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interest: An Essential But
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 976-77 (1988); Gary
Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1210-11 (1985) (providing a
critical historical overview); Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12
(1992).
208. Since Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which established the "right to
privacy," certain members of the judiciary and conservative commentators have said that they
cannot see what lies in the penumbras of the "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights... that
help give them life and substance." Id. at 484. Clearly that is the case, for these members of
the judiciary have been ignoring the rights that huddle in the shadows of the enumerated rights
for twenty-five years since Griswold, just as they were ignored for the one hundred years before
Griswold. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding govern-
mental exclusion of citizens of Japanese ancestory from their homes). The job of determining
those rights that lie in the shadows should be given to an institution capable of detecting those
shapes lurking in the shadows, not to an institution that has declared, and proven, itself to be
legally blind.
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yet I need it to talk to you.2° 9
The vocabulary of the Court does not permit an adequate description of
either the problem of minority voices not being heard on television or of the
rationale for a solution to that problem. The Court's majority members are
not trained to understand or hear what is outside of their ken of experience
or language. The problem of minorities not being heard by the majority
culture exists. And it is demonstrable, but not within the prevailing word-
stock of the current judiciary.
Trying to tell the doctor where it hurts
like the Algerian
who walked from his village, burning
his whole body a cloud of pain
and there are no words for this
except himself21 °
The Algerian presenting only himself is viewed by the Metro Broadcasting
dissenters and the Lamprecht majority as failing to make his case. A re-
quirement that one offer more than oneself, to prove data that has no mean-
ing, is senseless. What more than oneself can one offer?
Although it is not always the case, in this instance, there is a body that has
diagnosed the illness and offered a cure. Congress has acknowledged a nexus
between minority station-ownership and a greater degree of minority pro-
gramming. 21I By flatly disregarding Congress' findings, the Lamprecht ma-
jority has effectively displaced Congress' findings with its own assertions that
no such nexus exists.2 12 The decision thus removes the power to determine
the "public good" from an open, representative body and vests it in a non-
elected, non-representative body.
In a democratic system of government, judgments about the public good
must be made through the deliberative political process. Lamprecht is not
about the protection of an individual right-no one has a right to own a
broadcast station.2 13 Rather, the decision concerns the regulation of broad-
209. ADRIENNE RICH, The Burning of Paper Instead of Children, in THE FACT OF A
DOORFRAME 116, 117 (1984).
210. ADRIENNE RICH, Our Whole Life, in THE FACT OF A DOORFRAME, supra note 209,
at 133.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 196-97.
212. Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 396-98 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Justice Thomas' opinion
sets forth highly selective statistics regarding programs broadcast over stations owned by wo-
men. See id. Chief Judge Mikva's dissent parses Justice Thomas' statistics. See id. at 412-14
(Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
213. In FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), the Court found that:
The policy of the [Communications] Act is clear that no person is to have anything in
the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a license ....
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cast-station ownership in the public interest. Where individual rights are not
at risk, a court may not dictate its preference for what constitutes the public
interest. Doing so elevates personal whimsy over majority will.
214
Plainly it is not the purpose of the Act to protect a licensee against competition but
to protect the public.
Id. at 475.
214. The Constitution "is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the acci-
dent of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not
to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with
the Constitution of the United States." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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